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centre of all the organs of sense. If it be true, then, that 
sense is not intrinsically necessary to consciousness, neither 
can the brain, the organ of sense, be thus necessary . 
To the sixth edition of his book Hartmann adds a chapter 
not contained in the first (the intervening editions I have not 
seen) on “The Unconscious and the God of Theism.” It may 
be worth while to notice briefly some of the points made in it. 
On the first page of this chapter (535) the author declares : 
“It is not for me to prove that the unconscious, physical 
functions, which as such are sufficient for the explanation of all 
that needs explanation, are not, on the other hand, in the All- 
in-one [“im All-Einen,” i.e. in “The Unconscious”] con- 
scious. On the contrary, those who would add to our hypothesis 
this supplement [the view that they are conscious functions] 
which is wholly valueless, and unnecessary for the explanation 
of the phenomena of the universe, must themselves furnish the 
proof of their doctrine.” This is turning the tables on Theists 
with a vengeance. The self-complacency of the passage is 
certainly astounding. It has not been shown that “ uncon- 
scious physical functions ” are sufficient to explain what is to 
be explained. Take one example, our author’s discussion of 
the origin of language. The conclusion is reached that language 
is the result of the operation of an unconscious social instinct, 
and not “the mechanical work of a conscious God” (1st ed., 
p. 232), and this conclusion is one of the premises from which 
the inference is drawn that the Being who is all in all, the first 
and the last, is unconscious. The facts are, following our 
author’s account, these : an instinct, unconscious in man, 
accomplishing a certain result, but acting only as a secondary 
cause ; and (as we learn in the metaphysical portion of the 
work) an original and Supreme Being, from whom the instinct 
proceeds, and who acts through the instinct, so that what the 
instinct is figuratively said to do, is really the work of this 
Being. (As above indicated, Hartmann makes man and the 
universe completely dependent on, simply manifestations of, 
this Supreme Being, “the Unconscious.”) There are two 
distinct causes recognized : the secondary cause, in the present 
case the instinct, of which the beings in which it is figuratively 
said to operate are more or less unconscious, and the prime or 
real cause, an original being. The “ unconscious physical 
functions ” are the secondary causes, and when Hartmann 
savs that they “ are sufficient for the explanation of all that 
needs explanation,” he simply contradicts himself, for they are 
in his own view but the modes of the manifestation of one 
supreme ideal cause, which is the true cause, and which there- 
