270 
fore alone is adequate truly to explain the phenomena to be 
explained. Now, Hartmann may or may not consider the 
question whether what is unconscious in the effect (the 
secondary cause) is unconscious also in the (prime) cause, 
that depends on his own good pleasure. But he is not to be 
permitted to impose on others by so evident a sophism as that 
by which he impliedly passes from the unconsciousness of the 
foimer (the effect, the instinct in man) to the unconsciousness 
ot the latter (the original being who causes and works through 
the instinct). This fallacy runs all through the chapter, and 
I shall not attempt to follow out all the indications of its 
presence. I will cite only one more instance. On p. 545 our 
author, arguing that we have no right to suppose that, because 
" e , vv ien we see k fo accomplish a purpose, are conscious of 
that purpose, therefore the " Unconscious ” (the God of natural 
ana levealed religion) is conscious of His purposes, says : “ We 
see even in the case of individual instincts, that the individual 
looks out for its future, without knowing what it does, and we 
see likewise in the case of generic instincts, that the individual 
labours for the end of the genus, i.e. for individuals other than 
himself, without any suspicion as to who they are, for whom he 
torments and sacrifices himself.” Here again the puerile 
sophism reappears ; because the animal (or, as the case may be 
man ; speaking generally, the effect, the creature) is uncon- 
scious in some or all of its actions, therefore the original and 
universal cause is unconscious ! 
By a very familiar metaphor we quite properly term (not 
define) consciousness the light of the mind. The negative 
term “ unconscious ” then signifies simply the absence of mental 
light, an intellectual blank, or, really, positively, nothing. But 
the student of Hartmann's " Philosophy of the Unconscious ” 
in its original form found that the “ Unconscious ” here treated 
of was far from being practically an ideal nonentity. Absolute 
“ clairvoyance ” was ascribed to it, perfect intelligence, a perfect 
and immediate intuition which rendered unnecessary for it the 
slow processes of discursive thought, and a universal presence 
ana agency, this agency being repeatedly termed “ providence ” 
whether general or particular. Now, consciousness, as directly 
and immediately known to us, is the function of a finite spirit 
and no sober tlieist, or, for that matter, philosopher, would ever 
think of ascribing to God a consciousness so hedged in with 
limitations as our own Only, he would say, for obvious reasons, 
the "mental light” of God can in any case not be inferior to 
that of man but must be superior to it, indeed, absolutely per- 
feet ; and if he sought to form some feeble conception of it, it 
