2 72 
see tl Imw ,1 'rtf C f‘° n °! a rIletoricaI faIIC -''- It is impossible to 
which T i. ,™, su P ra - cmsci ™s” leaves the subject to 
does the Z PP !“ any m ° re " P° si tively undefined,” than 
we hate in™ tr t un , c ° nscl0 “ s os the other hand, 
our author ttoftw* ' 6 l ’ CpC!, l t "‘ . 1,11,1 earnest assurance of 
drfn1? th n ‘w ,' e fo ™ er e P‘ thet ,s equivalent to a “ negative 
of the 1 no V 6 k ; n °"' “ otl ' m ?> >'e more than once assures us, 
cil e ” P h° r e natU L e ° f tim intellection of the "Supra-con- 
in Wnd ft th" 6 “ ay - be Certa ‘ n that is “ sbsolutelv opposed ” 
in kind to the conscious processes of the human mind. Surelv 
rieal 1S cHt,v e T °u negative definiti <m- But, mere rheto’ 
ical criticism aside, does not this exchange of terms this 
substitution of trie “ Supra-conscious ” for the “ Unconscious - 
make patent to every understanding the logical weakness (to 
say the least) of the « Philosophy of the Uncofs"? ?hSe 
s a lallacy m reasoning, which the ancients termed perteamc 
i ie aXXo 7^°C, Where the conclusion reached differs from that 
for which the premises were professedly sought. I cannot help 
It existed of tl l! s fallac J in the case now before us. 
tinn n V h a earhe , r edltl0ns of the work under considera- 
° a f f T hlC j the Word "wpra-conscious" was not mentioned • 
sTo ^rr °i thi l term int0 the last edition » but a 
S lit of the fallacy and, as it were, an index to it, and does bv 
no means constitute it. The - Unconscious,- of which we 
2' t0 T f the Philosophy,- was named at the outset by a 
name which at once suggested the state known to us, and only 
conceivable, as mental darkness. In the “ inductive - portions 
of the work, the physical and psychological facts and P ?ocesses 
which were chosen to demonstrate the existence of the " Un 
conscious, were all instances of action in which the apparent 
agent though act.ng, as the result in each case stowed 
wisely y e t knew not what he (or it) did. The trustful 
nofbc l f< d t Wmg Wlth c ? rious interest the “induction,” would 
not be led to suppose that any other notion of the “ Uncon 
serous was to be finally inferred, than that which the facts 
illustrated. Least of all would he expect this if he bore in 
mind the axiomatic truth, that the less cannot produce the 
gi eater, nor premises warrant conclusions which tliev do not 
virtually contain. How great, therefore, must be his astonish- 
ment on finding, as a “ speculative result- of the whole in- 
qmry, that the Unconscious,- far from suffering under a lack 
o mental light, apprehends - instantaneously hi its one view 
whl n e iTT ""I i UdS ° f 1 thc un ^erse, and far from beJ 
without the knowledge of what it does, is all-knowing as well 
as all-wise ! And this astonishment can only be increased 
