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theory of a personal and conscious Deity. Were there in God 
an absolute consciousness, then, in consequence of the above 
view concerning the relation of the human to the Divine Spmt, 
we should, he says, necessarily expect the Divine consciousness 
so to “ shine into ” the individual consciousness, that “ the 
individual would find himself completely illuminated by the 
absolute consciousness, and the latter would lie open to las 
view.” But this, says our author, is contrary to experience. 
This reasoning seems too puerile to receive an answer. No one 
knows better or emphasizes more expressly, than Hartmann, 
the fact that the human consciousness is beset at all points 
with limitations. Being finite, how can it contain the infinite . 
being imperfect, how can it completely reflect the perfect. 
The human mind is, indeed, illuminated by the -Reason, the 
Word of God, “ which lighteth every man that cometli into 
the world.” The light of the Absolute does shine into it, 
however faintly, and it catches, as in the far-off distance, 
Glimpses of the “ Absolute Consciousness.” But the reasons 
why it does not fully take in, and is not thus practically 
identical with the latter, are so obvious, that one wonders that 
any writer should dare expect ot his readers sufficient sim- 
plicity to be imposed upon by his facile ignoring ot them. 
This is only less wonderful than the attempt to derive the 
light of human consciousness from the darkness ot the 
unconscious. T t *. 
Many modern speculators, and among them Hartmann, 
evince a painful fear lest any other philosophy than wliat they 
are pleased to term “ Monism ” should be received l ie prin- 
ciple of the universe must be one, they say, and all things 
derivable from it. To this Christian idealism heartily assents. 
But Monism, we are told (p. 541), is utterly incompatible with 
the assumption of a conscious Deity. Such a being were 
necessarily a “ transcendent God,” separate from the world 
(Dualism), and not an “ immanent ” one, present in the uni- 
verse, and related to the latter as substance to manifestation. 
Further, such a being could not be immanent in the world and 
in man “ without a collision of consciousnesses. it will re- 
nuire but little reflection to meet these difficulties, and 1 may 
iustlv leave the task to the reader. I will only remark that it 
to say the least, interesting to find a metaphysician ot Dai - 
mann’s pretensions fearing a “ collision ” between the fim e 
and the infinite, the dependent and the independent, to the 
detriment of the latter (!) ; and, further, that the “ God of 
Theism” is at once transcendent and immanent, being omni- 
present, though we may rightly prefer, with Saint laul, to say 
VOL- XI. U 
