u lev” But just as the real objects which these latter terms 
denote cannot, except to their destruction, be separated from 
their organic relation to the body which they serve, so reason, 
intelligence, will, vanish into nothingness when isolated from 
their living, functional relation to the personal subject or self 
which manifests itself and works through them. But self can- 
not be without consciousness. What sort of a self would that 
be. which did not know itself? The very notion of self is that 
of an ideal, self-knowing subject or agent. He, then who 
separates from their relation to a personal, self-knowing subject, 
the realities designated by will, reason, and intelligence, and 
ascribes them, in a form equal or superior to that in which they 
exist in man, to any other kind of subject, must be pronounced 
guilty of violating the laws of inductive inference, and of otter- 
ing arbitrary violence to the facts of existence. The griffin 01 
centaur of the Greek imagination was not more purely fanciful 
in its nature than is such an “ uncoiiscious intelligence. ■ 1° 
expect from it the functions of intelligence would be, as far as 
we can judge from experimental fact or by logical analogy, not 
less chimerical than to expect the waggon to start off and run 
like the horse, when the legs of the latter have been amputated 
and attached to the former. 
Unconscious and unintelligent are practically equivalent 
terms We must therefore agree with a writer m Johnson s 
Encyclopaedia (New York, 1875, vol. i. p. 1075, sub voce “Evo- 
lution”), that “unconscious intelligence” is “certainly an 
unthinkable phrase, a c pseudo-idea/ when proposed as the 
designation of an active power in nature.” The same may be 
said of the phrase “ unconscious will,” which is but the equiva- 
lent, in idealistic phraseology, of the “ blind force of me- 
chanical physics. „ , . 
The world, according to Christian idealism, is from God, who 
is a spirit, and not from matter. Not only, therefore, do the 
conditions of our knowledge and the laws of investigation com- 
pel, but the very nature of the case as stated requires, that «e 
proceed from our knowledge of spirit to the explanation of 
matter and physical force, and not conversely, like the ma e- 
rialists, from a fancied knowledge of the latter to a dogmatic 
decision as to what the former must be. Matter must be the 
product of spirit; why should we not say that it is a function 
of spirit ? for certainly spirit is not the function of matter. It 
the real has its origin and life in the ideal, if “matter be the 
product of spirit (the universe, the creation and handiwork ot 
God) how can the former possess a nature wholly opposed to 
and incommensurate with the latter? No : not to insist upon 
