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ewe itself to have arisen out of universal nothing. This obliges us, then 
m the last resort, to believe that absolute truths belong to a Necessary 
eing, and the eternal consciousness of the world to God himself— i.e. a 
conscious Being with whom is absolute goodness, absolute wisdom, absolute 
foundation 0lUte ^ ^ ^ TllUS much ’ then ’ for our Philosophical 
But, with respect to the sphere of unconscious intelligence, perhaps 
it may assist the discussion to make a few remarks. Almost every one is 
aware that a great proportion of his thinking goes on, as we said, from 
mere habit. We do not elaborate every process of thought on every occa- 
sion, after we have once arrived at the use of our inner power. Our 
mental action . really is, to a large extent, as habitual as our bodily 
action, and it is only when we come to any crux in our mental action 
that we exert ourselves to compare what we are doing with an external 
truth. Let us, then, attain knowledge of any number whatever of 
ordinary processes, and we shall but arrive at the conclusions of habitual 
leason, and not reach the higher movement of that active reason which is 
consciousness. I hope I am intelligible on this point, because, although 
the subject is a difficult one, there is no reason why we should speak 
of it in difficult words, and I am trying to use the easiest, but at the 
same time, if possible, correct words. Unconscious reason is, thus I 
say, impossible only in the ultimate resort. In our minds, as well as’ in 
our bodies, we are partly creatures of habit, and habit in the mind is 
unconscious reason. Our author, then, has wisely called attention to 
tins part of a great subject. 
We are indebted to Professor Morris not only (as I said) for bringing 
this subject forward, but also for the brief historical sketch he has 
given us ; with which, however, I should be, nevertheless, obliged to 
find some fault, if there were time. It seems an ungrateful thing to 
do, but I find the statement of the author as to the theory' of 
Uescartes is scarcely such as I understand to be Descartes’ view. 
Of the three forms of idealism, one of which only the author has 
referred to all three recognize the reality of intelligence. I mean by 
the three forms of idealism, that of Kant, that of Berkeley, and that 
of Descartes. They all recognize the intelligent being as really existin'* 
and they all of them hesitate to speak of the outer world, matter or 
substance, as it is put in this paper. Kant considers the outer world the 
phenomena world as non-existent, but as a sign of something exi ting 
beyond itself. T us is the critical idealism of Kant; but the dogmatic 
idealism of Berkeley was of another kind. Ho said the whole universe 
of things consisted only of two classes-the perceiving beings and the 
perceived. For my own part, speaking as a Berkeleyan, I think that 
Bus is as simple a way of putting a great truth as we could well find 
His view of the outer world was, that it was nothing but a series of 
phenomena upheld by the power of God, -constantly sustained, however 
