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incompleteness, than in the incorrectness of my account. It would consist in 
my omission to state that Descartes “ seemed to leave no foundation at all, 
not even in the Divine will, for an external world,” and that his “ sceptical 
idealism ” " reduced the outer world, practically, to a kind of phantasmagoria.” 
Certainly, if my critic corrects me, it is in the phrases just quoted that he 
does it, for they contain all that he says on the subject. But in them he 
is manifestly expressing his own opinion as to the logical consequence of 
Descartes’ view, and not the view of Descartes himself. Moreover, this 
opinion, it appears to me, might be based on my own account of the doctrine 
of Descartes. Since writing the paper under discussion, I have had occasion 
carefully to study the works of Descartes, and to prepare an exposition of 
his exact teaching. On comparing my statement in this paper with the 
independent results of the study referred to, I do not find any positive 
incorrectness in the former. I regret all the more that my critic, after inti- 
mating that my statement “ as to the theory of Descartes ” was at least not 
in agreement with what he “ understood to be Descartes’ view,” did not 
state explicitly the point in which he supposed me to be in error. 
I have not stated that, in following the methed which proceeds from the 
known to the unknown, we proeeed from a complete comprehension of spirit 
to a similar comprehension of matter. I maintained, and still maintain, that 
what knowledge we possess of spirit is more original and absolute than any 
fancied knowledge which we may seem to have of matter, however incomplete 
the former may be ; and, further, that our ideas concerning matter arc hypo- 
thetical (as every philosophical scientist admits), and must be framed, in as 
far as we attribute to matter any substantive existence at all, after the analogy 
(near or remote) of that which we directly know of ourselves as spiritual 
entities. In this I differ from Descartes, and avoid what I conceive, and 
have in my paper indicated to be, a dangerous error of his. I agree, on the 
other hand, in so far with Leibnitz and the greater number of philosophical 
idealists known to history, whether pagan or Christian. My critic seems to 
agree with Descartes in virtually admitting “ as fact ” (apparently inexplic- 
able), the existence of really inert matter and blind force. Absolutely inert 
matter would be a substance which does nothing, which lias no power ; hence 
no power of resistance (such as is universally ascribed to matter — and it 
makes no difference whether you call this resistance “ active ” or passive), 
and which therefore manifests itself to us by no impression made by it upon 
ourselves. Such a conception I call logically absurd, because (among other 
reasons) it is in contradiction with the universal conditions of knowledge. From 
the point of view of positive science it is also false, since science knows 
nothing of matter apart from force. To prove, on the other hand, the irration- 
ality of the conception of blind force (which conception my critic seems to 
admit), I can advance no arguments which are not virtually contained in the 
two papers which I have had the honour to present to the Victoria Institute. 
How the force called “chemical” is related to conscious will, I cannot 
exactly state. I maintain only that an exhaustive and exact analysis must 
