448 
11. The objection raised by the Fatalist to the existence of a 
rational will as a distinct principle of action that is to say, dis- 
tinct from desire — is not easily disposed of, however firmly we 
may be convinced of its fallacy ; for however free * the will may 
be, it is impossible to conceive it, except as determined by some 
motive or other. And, if we allow this, how are we to distinguish 
it in kind from the desire which induces the duckling to seek 
the water, or the rook to avoid the gun ? If we answer that 
man is acted upon by motives which are beyond the comprehen- 
sion of the brute, and which consequently do not set his 
psvchological machinery in motion, the Fatalist will point out 
that a difference also exists between the instincts of two given 
species of animal — that one animal is excited to action by 
objects or qualities of objects, which make no impression upon 
another ; that the flower, or rather the sweetness contained 
in the flower, possesses an attraction for the bee, which it does 
not possess for the spider ; and that, similarly, man is an animal 
endowed with social and moral instincts which influences him 
as automatically as the flower or the fly influence the spider 
or the bee, and that he is only a machine of more complex 
structure, and susceptible to motives which do not aflect the 
brute. D’Holbach says : 
“ When Mutius Sccevola held his hand in the fire, he was as much acting 
under the influence of necessity, caused by interior motives that urged 
him to this strange action, as if his arm had been held by strong men ; 
Pride, despair, the desire of braving his enemy, a wish to astonish him, 
an anxiety to intimidate him, &c., were the invisible chains that held his 
hand bound to the fire. The love of glory, enthusiasm for their country, in 
like manner caused Codms and Decius to devote themselves for their fellow- 
citizens. The Indian Calanus and the philosopher Peregrinus were equally 
obliged to burn themselves by the desire of exciting the astonishment of 
the Grecian assembly.” t 
On tlie same principle I have been compelled to lay this paper 
before the Institute, and at its close some learned member will 
be compelled to propose a vote of thanks to me fordoing what 
I have really been unable to help. . 
12. Whenever we attempt to escape from this net of sophistry, 
we encounter a Fatalist with a drawn sword. If we point to 
* Locke very justly remarks that the freedom is in the agent, and not in 
the will, and that therefore the common expression, “ freedom of the will, 
is erroneous. I use the expression, however, relatively to the desires, 
t System of Nature. 
