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the conflict which continually arises between the desires and 
the rational will, we are told that this is merely a conflict 
between two different desires, and is of the same nature as, for 
example, the conflict between rage and fear in the brute/ If 
we assert that man frequently acts from moral principles, we 
are told that he is impelled either by a separate moral instinct, 
or by a desire of approbation, whether from the world at large! 
or a supposed impartial spectator ; or that his action proceeds 
from a desire engendered by the perception that the sacrifice 
of a present inclination will be attended by greater ulterior 
benefit to himself. If he acts from religious motives, we are 
told that he is automatically influenced by the association in 
his mind of particular actions with his belief in future rewards 
and punishments. Finally, if he raises his hand, or lets it fall 
in order to show the freedom of his will by an arbitrary action, 
we are informed that the very desire to demonstrate the 
freedom of his will is the automatic cause of the action. It 
will be seen from this that the Fatalist regards a human agent 
as acting from necessity whenever he acts from a motive; and 
as every sane man acts from some motive or other, the corollary 
of this view is, that there is no mental condition intermediate 
between that of an automaton and that of a lunatic. 
13. Again, if we accept this fatalistic view, it is evident that 
we are not only precluded from considering man as a free agent, 
but that we are also unable to conceive the existence of any 
free agent whatever ; for whenever we shall attempt to picture 
to ourselves an abstract being endowed with infinite wisdom 
and power, we must, nevertheless, regard his actions as deter- 
mined and limited by motives : and thus the view that action 
from motives is the same thing as necessary action conducts us 
into a manifest dilemma. It is quite reasonable to consider that 
whenever the rational will either does not exist, or does not 
operate, the agent acts from necessity. “ Wherever thought is 
wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the 
direction of thought, there necessity takes place. This in an 
agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation 
of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind is called 
compulsion ; when the hindering or stopping any action is 
contrary to his volition, it is called restraint. Agents that have 
no thought, no volition at all, are in everything necessary 
agents/’* But the Fatalist has not known where to stop. 
Perceiving the existence of an automatic principle in man, he 
* Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding. 
