450 
has applied it to all human thoughts and actions under the 
influence, as 1 am inclined to think, of an idea which lias given 
birth to many fallacies j viz., tha thaving established the exist- 
ence of a principle, it argues a truly philosophic mind to make 
it as universal as possible. , , , , 
14. The issue, then, with the Fatalist may be reduced to the 
following terms : — “ You consider/ 5 we may say to him, all 
human actions to be necessary actions because lev procee 
from motives. But this position requires the assumption of 
the principle that all actions which proceed from motives aie 
necessary actions, a principle which entails the consequence 
that every rational agent acts from necessity, and therefore that 
there is no such thing as a free agent. The limits which are 
placed on human freedom in regard to action do not touch 
the question at all ; for the point under discussion is, primarily, 
the freedom of thought, and not the freedom of action. Unless, 
therefore, you are prepared to allow the inevitable consequence 
of your principle, you must renounce the principle itsell, and 
admit that action from motives is not always necessary action. 
And, as you admit, on the other hand, the principle of auto- 
matism, it is clear that there must be a point where automatism 
ceases, and free agency begins. 55 
15. This limit is to be found in our own natures, where we 
discover the two principles of automatism and free agency 
existing side bv side. The difficulty of practically disentangling 
the automatic from the rational principle in any given action 
does not obviate the fact of their being two essentially distinct 
conceptions. The nature of the automatic principle is unmis- 
takably shown in those actions the objects of which are 
unknown to the agent, when the action, though beneficial to 
him, is immediately produced by desire, but where the desire 
cannot have been awakened by a knowledge of the iene 
resulting from its indulgence, inasmuch as this knowledge does 
not exist — at least in the mind of the agent. There are also 
actions which are produced by knowledge on the part of t le 
ao-ent; and these are what we usually term rational actions. 
That desire is sometimes concerned in the production of rational 
actions— that is, actions which result from the knowledge and 
reflection of the agent— is quite true. Our observation of blind 
instinct teaches us that the perception of certain qualities of an 
object or a particular condition of body, excites a desire, and 
produces an action ; and if, in the course of our reasoning on 
any subject, the images of such objects present themselves, it. is 
natural that they should awaken the desire and influence our 
actions, or even our reasoning, automatically. But desire itseit 
