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the term is commouly understood, is not in itself a satisfactoiy 
basis of distinction between man and brute. Understanding 
intellect as the sum of the intellectual faculties, the ordinary 
inquirer is perplexed bv the discovery of the fact that brutes o 
unquestionably both abstract and generalize. But wliat are 
the real facts of the case? When a particular object is pre- 
sented to my consciousness, I find, as a matter of experience, 
that one or more attributes of that object will often awaken an 
emotion or a desire which, if unrestrained, will pass into action, 
while the remaining attributes of the same object are compara- 
tively or entirely disregarded. Unconsciously, and quite inde- 
pendently of my rational will, a separative or analytical process 
has been performed, and I find that I have abstracted. Further, 
the contemplation of this particular attribute has called up m 
my mind the images of other objects possessing the same 
attribute, and thus the process of generalization has been 
accomplished. And these processes deal not only with ideas or 
thoughts, but with whatever objects come within the range of 
my consciousness — with all the perceptible attributes of matter, 
with form, or colour, or extension, as well as with emotions or 
sensations; all of which are sorted, separated, or associated 
irrespectively of my rational will. Let me suppose, for example, 
that I want to examine the truth of the proposition that all 
red-headed men have freckled complexions— it is not of conse- 
quence whether the proposition is absurd or not. Unless my 
mind is sufficiently abstract to be capable of considering the 
quality of red-headedness apart from any individual of whom it 
may be a characteristic, I first of all fix my attention on a 
particular red-headed man ; and in a short time I find that the 
images of different red-headed persons whom I have met in the 
course of my experience pass before my miud like Banquo anc 
the eight kings. Each of these images I can arrest in its passage, 
and again examine until my memory produces the fact of the 
person whom it represents being freckled or otherwise. But 1 
cannot at once summon up all the images of red-headed people 
that are stored away in the recesses of my memory ; some of 
them may drop in now and then for the next month, especially 
if my mind is much exercised on the subject. Aud I cannot 
in every case where the image is recalled recollect whether the 
person was actually freckled or not. It is quite clear, there- 
fore that the process which evolves the images is not directly 
under the control of the rational will, but that it is self-work- 
ing or automatic. The investigation by which I proposed to 
verify the generalization was indeed initiated by the rational 
will, and the rational will intervened at different stages. But, 
in such instances, it merely utilizes the mental processes which 
