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The Chairman. — I think the author says a certain part of them, but when 
they pass to a certain point that is not so. 
Mr. Row. — Very well. I observed repeatedly on reading the paper that 
one important matter is left out, and that is the formation of our habits. 
The fact is that after certain of our habits are formed, they seem to become 
what we call instinctive, and many have become to a certain extent 
automatic, which were clearly not automatic in their origin. There is a 
theory which is not mentioned in this paper, and that is the theory of 
transmitted habits. Transmitted habits, accumulated by and coming from 
our ancestors, seem to me to be a matter which it is very di ffi cult to conceive ; 
but there certainly are some startling facts in support of the theory. Finally, 
I cannot agree with Mr. Morshead’s remarks on our personal freedom and 
on our belief in that freedom. 
Rev. Prebendary Irons. — The writer of this paper seems to imagine that 
it is in the interest of religion to believe that animals are automatic. Surely 
there could be no more serious mistake than to put the matter thus. Let 
us discover the exact truth and conform our theories to the facts, but do not 
let us for a moment suppose that religion is committed to the question one 
way or the other. True religion and real foots are not in contradiction 
with each other. Since the truths of religion stand on a solid foundation, 
no facts can come into collision with them. With regard to the paper itself, 
I think that its facts are carefully put together, and that there is much 
ingenious expression and clearness of thought, if we concede the author’s 
philosophy at the outset ; but to a person like myself, wholly differing from 
his philosophy, the paper is only interesting as a theory worked out by 
one whom I am merely watching, in order to see how he does it. The 
mistake of the paper is that it has altogether left out the physical necessities 
of the universe. We cannot admit a physiology and psychology apart from 
physical science ; and the laws of physical science, although now more under- 
stood than ever, have not as yet touched the primary philosophical question 
of causation. The principal point at the bottom of these inquiries is, in 
what sense these animals are causes,— and also in what sense we are causes. 
There lies the whole of the issue. I do not see that certain of the pro- 
positions in this paper have any sense whatever, from my own point of 
view. This is a strong thing to say, and I explain it in this way. The 
author of the paper speaks of so many abstractions, and of so many effects 
and powers of the existence of which I feel entirely ignorant, that I may be 
excused for considering it an entirely unintelligible view. I have been 
accustomed to say that the individual, — the man, the ego , — is a cause, and 
wherever I recognize an ego, even of an inferior kind, I recognize the origin 
of a certain amount of active causation. Thus, I speak of myself as a cause, 
and certain acts come from me as the cause ; but the abstractions used in 
this paper appear to me to be unintelligible on the ground of any sound 
philosophy. Abstractions unfortunately play a remarkable part in meta- 
physics. To say, I think, I feel, I remember, is intelligible ; and yet I am 
not a mere compound of thought and feeling and memory. I myself am a 
