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unit ; and that is the only philosophy that I can adhere to. You might as 
well tell me that my leg is made up of walking and running, as say that 
I am made up of reflecting and thinking, or any other abstractions. It is I 
who reflect. I am a thinking being, and I exercise my power of thought in 
an infinite variety of ways, for which, perhaps, I have not an infinite variety 
of expression. You will see, therefore, that I cannot even quote from this 
paper to criticise it, I differ so widely. I have arrived at the conclusion 
that it is only suited for the consideration of those who hold some modifica- 
tion of Locke’s opinions. Mr. Row has given us some reasons for throwing 
aside the extraordinary attempt to consider all animals as automata ; but 
few, after all, will ever maintain that animals are only a species of machines 
acting from “ springs,” to which certain names are given, but which, what- 
ever names may be given, are only names after all. How we are to regard 
them is another question. 
Rev. J. Fisher, D.D.— I consider the paper to be a very able one, and 
very well written from the writer’s standpoint ; but I take a different stand- 
point myself. I am inclined to go with the writer generally, for I think he 
has studied the subject more than I have, but I cannot go with him in this. 
The paper is on psychology, and psychology has nothing at all to do with 
automata. An automaton has no psychology in it ; and in the very hypothesis 
that animals are mere automata, psychology is altogether left out of the 
question, for there is no room for it. An automaton does not live, an 
animal does live ; an automaton does not feel, an animal does feel ; an 
automaton has no self-impelling movement, an animal has. Psychology, 
therefore, is altogether thrown out by the hypothesis that an animal is a mere 
automaton. An animal has instinct : a man has instinct, and a child has 
instinct, as well as lower animals ; and in proportion as the organism, so to 
speak, or the animal rises in intelligence, the instinct becomes less and the 
reasoning powers, of course, become greater. An auimal has instinct, but it 
has something more besides. Is it by instinct that the elephants at Astley s 
perform their movements ? Is it by instinct that dogs will do so many 
things which we know they do ? Man has little instinct because he has little 
need" for it ; but, on the other hand, he has intellectual powers, and by these he 
is guided. I think the writer of this paper has argued well from his point 
of view, but then his point of view is not mine, and tor a Christian to widen 
his circle in this way is only to make room for unbelievers. There are many 
things in the paper which are open to exception : for instance— the author 
speaks of instinct as being the sole source of action in animals ; he explains 
the passionate action of a dog, as springing from self-defence. Then he 
speaks of abstraction and generalization in the brain, but the brain has 
nothing of the kind. All these things are open to exception, but they seem 
to arise in consequence of a wrong impression in the writer’s mind, that it is 
necessary to establish a differentiation between man and the lower animals, 
other than those which we know to exist. 
Mr. Dibdin.— I do not think that the discussion does justice to the paper. 
With regard to Dr. Irons’ remarks, he will find that Mr. Morshead distinctly 
