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the Bushman and the European, we must either invest the chimpanzee with 
the attribute of moral responsibility or we must withhold this attribute »rom 
man. Viewed in this light, the conception that all the intellectual and 
moral attributes of man are merely higher developments of similar attributes 
existing in the lower animals, is one which strikes at the root of the doctrine 
of moral responsibility. This theory is much in favour with sceptical writers 
and I believe it to exist, more or less distinctly formulated, in the minds of 
a far greater number of educated persons than is commonly supposed. It is 
not, however, the province of this Institute to deal primarily with the moral 
bearing of scientific questions; and my inquiry was addressed entirely to 
the facts on which the theory was based ; the arguments contained m my 
paper being directed chiefly against the attempts which have been made, 
in conformity with the theory in question, to obliterate the distinction be- 
tween man and brute. , 
I think Mr. Row will find that the points raised by him have been 
anticipated. The sense in which I used the phrase “ natural sagacity . is 
explained in sec. 8 of the paper. The question of transmitted habits is a 
very interesting one, but it hardly came within the scope of my argument. 
In reply to Dr. Irons, I will point out that it is impossible to establish 
a distinction between man and brute without considering the attributes of 
each separately. It was held both by Descartes and Aristotle that animals 
are automata. 
The objections of Dr. Eisher apply principally to my terminology. 1 used 
the word psychology to express the attributes of the xpvxv collectively, and 
therefore as including the appetites and passions, which I showed to be 
plainly automatic, in so much as they produce actions without the interven- 
tion of the rational will. Of course this is an extension of the sense in 
which the term is usually employed, but the extension is perfectly legitimate. 
I do not mean, however, to compare the wonderful mechanism of the animal 
■with the automaton chess-player at the Westminster Aquarium. 
It is an error to suppose that the term “ automatism ” is inapplicable to 
living creatures. An automaton is, as a matter of fact, a machine of human 
construction, and, therefore, destitute of sensation ; but the absence ot sensa- 
tion is not included in the essential idea of automatism. What I mean when 
I speak of animals as automata is that they are constructed in such a manner 
as to act of their own accord under particular conditions. This conception in 
no wise derogates from the wisdom of the Creator ; for a tree is as certainly a 
piece of Divine workmanship as an animal, and yet it has not even “ auto- 
matism.” Every impulse of anger or fear is automatic ; in fact the word is 
continually used to distinguish involuntary from voluntary actions. 
I am sorry that Mr. Dibdin omitted to indicate the defect in my argument 
against fatalism ; had he done so, I might have been able to supply it. 
