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fact of the mind"s existence and supremacy. The exclusive 
study of physics is calculated to beget materialistic habits of 
thought. Physiology and physics have to do with organized 
and unorganized bodies, and this department of study implies 
necessity of nature , rather than liberty of intelligence. The 
natural bias, therefore, which it is liable to beget in the human 
mind, is one in favour of materialism, and therefore of fatalism. 
Its natural counteractive is in the study of mind. Mr. Grove, 
in his address before the British Association, appeared to 
betray materialistic habits of thought, if not unduly to exalt 
physical science. He said, “ While in ethics, in politics, in 
poetry, in sculpture, in painting, we have scarcely, if at all, 
advanced beyond the highest intellects of ancient Greece or 
Italy, how great are the steps we have made in physical science 
and its applications/" Now it is only since the time of Bacon 
that physical science has been studied with any degree of 
success. (( MThen we reflect then (said Dugald Stewart) on 
the shortness of the period during which natural philosophy 
has been successfully cultivated, and, at the same time, how 
open to examination, the laws of matter are, in comparison 
of those which regulate the phenomena of thought, we shall 
(1) neither be disposed to wonder that the philosophy of mind 
should still remain in its infancy, nor (2) be discouraged in our 
hopes respecting its future progress/" 
Mind and Matter. 
If we believe neither in God, Angel, nor Spirit, miracles are 
plainly impossible. But if we admit the existence of God and 
of spiritual beings, and the supremacy of Mind, then miracles 
are, at least, possible. I would not appeal to Divine sovereignty 
and omnipotence in support of miracles, because the argument 
from this source may be questioned by doubters. However 
true the conclusion, the process by which it is arrived at is not 
satisfactory. It is an instance of the vicious circle in the eyes 
of those who have thrown off belief in revelation. It is, there- 
fvjie, better to seek a foundation, as I think we safely may, 
among facts and principles in the field of philosophical inquiry. 
1 erhaps I cannot define very satisfactorily to myself what I 
mean by mind, as distinct from matter ; but I know that I 
fh'inl, feel, hope, desire , and will , and I feel an irresistible con- 
viction that my thoughts, feelings, hopes, desires, and volitions 
a l belong to one and the same being, Yiz.,mijself These 
p lenomena, I believe, exhibit the qualities of mind, and prove 
ns existence as convincingly as extension, colour, hardness, &c., 
prove the existence of matter. At least, I cannot feel more 
