262 
certain of the existence of matter than I do of mind. If I 
am to draw a distinction, I feel the evidence for mind to be 
stronger than the evidence for matter ; for the former rests 
upon my own consciousness of subjective facts, while the 
latter rests upon my perceptions of what is, or what is thought 
to be, objective. I cannot, then, deny the Ego, and claim 
with any share of reason to believe in the non-ego . The non- 
ego is the phenomena exhibited to my senses, the subject- 
matter of physical science. The ego is the phenomena 
presented by my own consciousness, the subject - matter of 
mental and metaphysical science. “ The evidence for the 
existence of mind (said Lord Brougham) is to the full as 
complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of 
matter. Indeed, it is more certain, and more irrefra- 
gable.'” * 
Materialists, however, have doubted the separate existence 
of mind, notwithstanding its greater rapidity of movement, 
and the phenomena presented by it. But the attempt ha3 
been illogical, the very points in dispute being taken for 
granted, as a basis to argue upon. If we suppose the sub- 
stance said to have the qualities of thinking, feeling, &c., to 
be the same as the substance which is said to have extension, 
hardness, &c., this supposition only proves the impotence of 
materialism to grapple with its difficulties. Why should not 
these two substances underlying the two different kinds of 
phenomena, if they are to be considered as one and not two, 
be mind, after all, and not matter ? To quote Lord Brougham 
again on this point : — - e< We only know the existence of matter 
through the operations of mind ; and were we to doubt of the 
existence of either, it would be far more reasonable to doubt 
that matter exists than that mind exists. The existence of 
the operations of mind (supposing mind to exist) will account 
for all the phenomena which matter is supposed to exhibit ; but 
the existence and action of matter, vary it how we may, will 
never account for one of the phenomena of mind.”f 
However, I am glad to feel myself at liberty to pass over 
this point, because natural philosophers have given up the 
question of substance, and confined themselves to the pheno- 
mena exhibited, and the laws deducible therefrom ; and we 
may follow their example, and leave out of the question the 
nature of mind, confining ourselves to the phenomena it ex- 
hibits, and the laws deducible therefrom. The two sciences 
admit of precisely the same inductive principles, and may be 
prosecuted safely side by side. The law of gravity in the one 
* Discourse on Nat. Tlieol., p. 56. 
f Ibid. p. 106. 
