271 
have conditions which admit of human freedom being played 
in its own orbit or within prescribed limits. There is, we are 
sure, freedom even in dependence. The Almighty's omni- 
potence does not swallow up that limited power which He 
has assigned to man. His omnipresence does not blot from 
existence that place which we, His creatures, occupy in space 
and time ; His omniscience does not absorb nor quench that 
little light which our reason gives us ; in short, the infinite 
does not annihilate the finite; otherwise, dependence would 
find no place in which to write its name, Divine Sovereignty 
no creature over which to exercise its just control. The 
unchangeableness of Grod must, therefore, be viewed in its 
relation to other things, such as the Divine purpose. 
There is yet another objection from metaphysics that pro- 
perly falls to be noticed here. No testimony , it has been objected , 
can reach to the supernatural, and therefore no miracle can be 
proved by the evidence of sense. This objection was urged 
for another purpose in a famous atheistical work ( Systeme de la 
Nature) published in 1780. The writer, said Lord Brougham, 
“ began by endeavouring to establish the most rigorous mate- 
rialism, by trying to show that there is no such thing as mind. 
The whole fabric is built upon this foundation ; and it would 
be difficult to find in the history of metaphysical controversies, 
such inconclusive reasoning, and such undisguised assumptions 
of the matter in dispute, as this fundamental part of his system 
is composed of. He begins by asserting that man has no 
means of carrying his mind beyond the visible world, that he is 
necessarily confined within its limits. He asserts what is 
absolutely contrary to every day's experience, and to the first 
rudiments of science — that we know, and can know, nothing 
but what our senses tell us.”* In Essays and Reviews the 
objection against miracles (not mind) stands thus : “No testi- 
mony can reach to the supernatural ; testimony can only apply 
to apparent sensible facts ; testimony can only prove an extra- 
ordinary and perhaps inexplicable occurrence or phenomenon ; 
that it is due to supernatural causes is entirely dependent on 
the previous belief and assumption of the parties. "f The 
objection, that w T e “ can know nothing but what our senses 
tell us," appears to me to be the same as saying that “ testi- 
mony can only apply to apparent sensible facts:" but in the 
former case it was urged to get rid of mind, in the latter, to 
get rid of miracles. But Mr. Powell professed to believe in 
'mind; he held that there is a world of intelligence — vorjrov, as 
* Discourse on Nat. Tlieol. ; note, p. 235. 
t Pp. 127, 128. 
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