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as to the preceding speakers Dr. Thornton argued, that because we could not 
assert our generalizations, on which our conceptions of law were founded, to be 
complete, we had no right to assume there were any laws at all ; and there- 
fore to assert any event to be opposed to natural laws was impossible — 
The Chairman. — I think Dr. Thornton stated nothing of that kind. I do 
not disagree with your statement, but it is only fair for me to say so, in 
justice to Dr. Thornton, who has now left the room. 
Mr. Warington. — Dr. Thornton stated that our knowledge of phenomena 
was necessarily imperfect in every case ; and he seemed to think that as that 
fact made our generalization equally imperfect, therefore we could not regard 
the generalization as equivalent to law. I ask is that true practically ? Of 
course, I agree with him theoretically, but not practically ; and the question of 
miracles is a practical question. We have no absolute demonstration that 
miracles were performed ; we have merely a certain number of probabilities. 
We cannot then demand demonstration against miracles if we cannot give it 
for them — I mean mathematical demonstration. For what does our know- 
ledge depend on ? For instance, I heard Dr. Thornton speak. How did I 
know what he meant by what he spoke ? Simply from a limited amount of 
observation as to what certain words signified. I cannot pretend to lay down 
as a fact that those words never could mean anything else. My generalization 
is imperfect. I cannot say it is a mathematical law that a certain word 
means a certain thing. I have only probability to guide me ; I take that and 
act upon it ; and I am practically right. Theoretically, however, I am not 
certain of the meaning of the words said to me ; yet, practically, I am right 
in acting as if I was. Just so with miracles. It is quite sufficient if the 
objector can show us a certain amount of probability against them without 
being able to give demonstration , for that is impossible. This is the great 
fallacy that runs through Mr. Mozley’s otherwise able book on miracles. 
He has assumed that because all laws of science are founded on imperfect 
generalizations, therefore they cannot be taken as proper reasons for coming 
to any conclusion. If that is admitted, we have no real reason for coming 
to any conclusion on any subject ; because in every case our reasons are 
simply dependent on probability, and not on mathematical demonstration. 
Then, — to take a point mentioned by a speaker before Dr. Thornton, — Why 
do not men of science inquire into the reason of things ? 
The Chairman. — It was not asked “ Why do not men of science inquire 
into the reason of things ? ” You are imputing an expression never used by 
Mr. Manners. 
Mr. Warington. — I mean the reason why bodies have certain properties — 
why laws exist. I understood he asked why men of science did not go 
further, and ask why bodies have certain properties ? If it is the fact, 
however, that we are unable to go back to this primal cause, is that any reason 
for our not taking the amount of scientific knowledge we have, as a fair ground 
and basis of reasoning ? Can we arrive at the primal cause of anything ? 
No. In any subject, the instant you go back to what is the primal cause why 
such and such a thing is, you are at sea ; and therefore there is no blame to 
