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this world, but, according to the remotest observations which we have made, 
reaching to the most distant objects. But there is another order of 
nature besides that which regulates the starry system. The order of 
nature which there prevails is surely entirely distinct from the laws of right 
and wrong in the human conscience, for example. There is a moral order 
of nature an entirely different thing from that material or external order of 
nature. I do not say they come into collision, but I mention that moral order 
of nature to show my position, that we are wrong in assuming there is but 
one order of nature, and that all things are ruled to happen in one way. I 
point to the laws of right and wrong, of justice, generosity, and truth, between 
man and man, which cannot be altered or changed by our mere will or caprice ; 
for what is equity here cannot be ^rnequity elsewhere. By the general 
conscience of mankind these laws are acknowledged ; and therefore, I say, 
theie may be other orders of nature besides that moral order of nature. I 
entirely dispute the assumption, as unfair to the whole subject, that there is but 
one order, and that a physical order of nature. But not only do I object 
to that assumption, but to the assumption, for which we have not yet I think 
sufficient data, that the physical external order of nature is bound together by 
suchinexorable principles of causation as that it is utterly inconceivable that any 
natural laws should reverse or change. Now it is perfectly conceivable, I do 
not say it is probable, that the doctrine of Mr. Hume in the last century may 
eventually be accepted as truth in philosophy, Mr. Hume affirmed there 
was no such thing as efficient causation in nature,— that one event lies by the 
side of another like two stones in a quarry ; and Mr. Mozley, in the book 
referred to by Mr. Warington, has actually assumed Mr. Hume’s principles ; 
he has taken the very doctrine of the sceptical philosopher, and has argued 
for the doctrine of miracles from Mr. Hume’s premises. He seems to me, 
however, thus to destroy the very foundations of theology in his eagerness 
to construct an argument for miracle. Mr. Mozley says Philosophers now 
are agreed that there is no efficient connection between one event and another.” 
That is his argument ; and thus he destroys the whole ground for believing 
in God Himself, or the Great First cause. Anything more monstrous I could 
scarcely conceive. Yet the Quarterly Review has praised his lectures, which 
aie sceptical, and the University of Oxford, I am sorry to say, has received 
them "with almost unmixed applause. I ask any gentleman present to give 
himself the trouble of reading the first two of those lectures to test what I 
lai e said. I am only referring to this, however, to illustrate the proposition 
that it is entirely an assumption, an unfair assumption, that efficient causa- 
tion is beyond all relaxation defended ex necessitate, by theologians more 
than others, if any party in the scientific or theological world has an 
interest m defending it, I should say it is the scientific men ; but if they 
lepudiate it, that is their afiair. They will find it difficult to proceed without 
it. In the next place, suppose we were to grant these two concessions, then 
we have to meet a third difficulty. If we grant there is but one order of 
nature, and yet find morality must be in some way twisted into the physical 
order of thmgs ; and if we concede that there is efficient causation which 
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