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I can find no difficulty about “ the expression ‘ laws of nature,’ ” such as our 
essayist and some previous speakers seem to have felt. Mr. English gives the 
instance of the hand, by the human will, arresting the fall of a stone ; and 
he speaks of our being “ able to control the forces of nature ” by our will ; 
while Mr. Penny says that “ every act of man may be called a miracle.” Well, 
I am as much a part of “ nature ” as the stone is ; and though my powers are 
different from that which presses down the stone, and from any inorganic 
force in nature ; still, to exercise my power to arrest the fall of a stone which 
is not too heavy for my strength is no miracle. I must protest against this 
confounding of terms. The use of philosophical disquisition is not to con- 
found and confuse, but to discriminate and analyze. Were I to arrest the 
fall of a stone a ton in weight, of course that would be considered super- 
human ; but whether it was truly supernatural or not might be a question, 
as we know that some men have naturally extraordinary strength. If I 
were to say I could do this, although it was known that previously I could 
do nothing of the kind, and if I attributed this power to God, people might 
well believe it to be a miracle. I further think that Mr. English made a 
mistake in attempting to find a theory of miracles, or an argument in support 
of them, that would include the sceptic. And I not only think he has failed 
in this attempt, but that it would have been a pity if he had succeeded. I 
say so, because in this matter “the sceptic” means the denier of 
the power of God— not merely a sceptic as to revelation, but rather an 
atheist, — and it would only be doubly irrational to believe in miracles and not 
in Deity. I am glad also to find that throughout the paper (the whole tone 
and main arguments of which I agree with, though obliged thus to criticise,) 
the real view of the writer crops out in spite of liis intention to discuss the 
question “ without reference to the omnipotence of God ; for in one place he 
speaks of miracles as “ God’s miracles in another, as having for “ their 
efficient cause the active power of God and, in fact, throughout his paper, 
as summed up in his concluding words, you will see that his whole argument 
has really reference to “ the Cause of all causes and I must say I should 
not know the use of miracles at all if they did not especially and purposely 
point in that direction. But I think I now have nearly done with criticism 
as far as it must appear to be adverse to the paper. There is, however, one 
incidental passage I must noticebefore I proceed further to substantiate the 
general drift of the paper by a new argument not hitherto advanced. The pas- 
sage I refer to is where the Alm ighty is described as being “ an Eternal Now— 
with whom there is no past nor future.” I am aware that this has become a 
mode of speaking of Deity which might almost be said to be fashionable. ; 
but I must object to it, if meant to be taken literally. At all events, as we 
cannot be supposed to comprehend Deity, and if we cannot ourselves under- 
stand how “ past, present and future should be as one ” — if to us such a 
notion is absolutely unintelligible — and if this notion is merely a concep- 
tion of our own applied to Deity, then I must protest against it ; and I 
will point to a single passage in Scripture which is entirely in opposition to 
this view. Christ as God is described as “ Alpha and Omega, the beginning 
