22 
of matter, which has been employed to give a reason for the 
perpetuation of personal identity . It has been thought that 
the identity of an individual may, supposing matter to be 
indestructible, be continued after death and the dissolution 
of the body of the present life, by the entrance of a single 
particle of that body into the composition of the risen body 
of the life to come. The physical philosophy I have been 
endeavouring to explain, which makes an absolute distinction 
between the immaterial and material parts of man (see sec. 24), 
and admits the destructibility of matter, points to the de- 
pendence of whatever is perpetuated on the immaterial — the 
spiritual. The same result is arrived at by considering what 
takes place in 'perfect sleep : consciousness departs, the body 
is there, the JEgo is not there ; I am as if I were not. If, then, 
the body, in its integrity, is incapable of maintaining con- 
tinuity of consciousness, how should there be, in a very small 
portion of it, the virtue to maintain continuity of person ? 
The teaching of Scripture appears to be, that the Creator of 
spirits has in His keeping the spirit of every man departed, 
to the end that, when united after resurrection to “ spiritual 
body ” (not the same body), it may give account of the deeds 
done in the body of flesh, whether good or bad. It is by 
this relation of deeds now to judgment then, that the power 
of God ensures personal identity. For these reasons, I do 
not admit that it is allowable to assume matter to be inde- 
structible, in order to account for the maintenance of personal 
identity. “If our earthly tabernacle-house were dissolved, 
we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, 
eternal in the heavens ” (2 Cor. v. 1). 
The Chairman. — Our thanks are due to Professor Challis for the valuable 
paper with which he has favoured us. 
Mr. T. Harriot. — I think that Professor Challis has somewhat mixed up 
the spiritual and the material in one section of his paper. Let us not forget 
that whilst St. Paul says that God may be known to man by His works in 
the natural world, He also tells us that the natural man cannot know the 
things of the Spirit of God, because they are spiritually discerned. 
The Chairman (C. Brooke, Esq., E.R.S.). — I very much regret that Pro- 
fessor Challis was not here to-night, to read his own paper ; because, though 
I am entirely in accord with him in regard to the drift of it, which, in fact, 
is contained in the paragraph on sec. 23, 4th part, to the effect that, 
“ If the foregoing course of reasoning has sufficed to certify that matter 
must have come into existence by the will and operation of a personal and 
intelligent Creator, by the same reasoning it is proved that matter is de- 
structible, inasmuch as a power that created it can destroy it, and if it be 
indestructible, it could not have been created. This is an axiom so self-evi- 
