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the suspicion that there were more things in heaven and earth 
than were dreamt of in his philosophy. Otherwise his con- 
fident dogmatism should be ascribed to his stolid incapacity or 
his narrow positiveness. We certainly see no objection if Prof. 
Tyndall feels none to his recognizing in the peasant the ideal 
of a true philosopher and placing himself by his side, as one 
who like him can only interpret the unknown by the known. 
When Prof. Tyndall insists that all the functions of the animal 
body can be explained by mechanical or galvanic agency, he 
seems to us to say, there are horses inside. Motiou, and heat, 
and breathing, and eating are the forces which I recognize and 
believe in, and these are the only forces which I accept. Were 
the German peasant told of steam and its expansive power, 
of its capacity of quick generation by heat and of condensation, 
and were there shown to him the steam boiler and the furnace — ■ 
he would doubtless say, the force and the laws of which you 
speak are both to me unknown, and I can only explain the 
unknown in terms of the known. Similarly when tho atten- 
tion of Prof. Tyndall is directed to the activities of spirit he 
replies, all these are practically unknown to me, for I believe 
in nothing except the mechanics of friction or the voltaic 
battery. That is to say, if we know or could know anything 
about terror, and hope, and calculation, and resolve, and ail 
the other phenomena that were evoked between the first im- 
pact of the light and the reaction on the muscles — we might 
explain the intervening phenomena, but inasmuch as we cannot, 
we must assume that they do not exist. They are to Science a 
set of unknown quantities, which have no claims to be scienti- 
fically recognized and can neither explain other phenomena 
nor be explained themselves. Prof. Tyndall by his subsequent 
concessions is far less excusable and far less philosophical than 
his associate philosopher. For Prof. Tyndall is frank enough 
to say that there are peculiar phenomena (he does not say there 
is a force) such as terror, hope, sensation, calculation, etc., 
which are associated with or attendant on the molecular 
motions set up by the waves of light in a pi-eviously prepared 
brain. But he denies that there is any causal connection 
between them. He rejects the explanation given by Mr. 
Bain, once partially admitted by himself, that the two are 
objective and subjective sides of the same phenomenon. He 
repeats, however, his position that the reason why we cannot 
unite them in a causal connection, is that while we can form a 
coherent picture of physical processes, as the stirring of the 
brain, the thrilling of the nerves (a new idea), the discharging 
of the muscles (previously the lifting of a latch), we can form 
no picture of a molecule pi’oducing a state of consciousness or 
