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lie in mechanism. The mechanism of the universe may 
be concluded within motion and the correlation of foi’ces ; 
but foi’ce is a quality, not a cause, and motion demands an 
origin, and beyond both lie the immensities of vitalism and 
of intelligence. 
Hume attempted to break down the teleological argument 
by assailing the conception of cause and effect. He main- 
tained that “ order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final 
causes, is not of itself any proof of design, but only so far as 
it has been experienced to proceed from that principle,” and 
also, that our experience of design, from the operations of the 
human mind, cannot furnish an analogy for “ the great 
universal mind,” which we thus assume to be the Author of 
Nature. Hence, according to Hume, before we could infer 
“ that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and 
act, like the human, it were requisite that we had experience 
of the origin of worlds, and it is not sufficient, surely, that 
we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and 
contrivance.” 
The first position of Hume is refuted by the universal 
consciousness of mankind. Most assuredly our belief that 
any particular object in which we perceive the adaptation of 
parts to each other, or of means to an end, must have pro- 
ceeded from a designing cause, does not arise out of a pre- 
vious observation or experience of such cause in objects of 
the same class. Of the millions of men who wear watches, 
how very few have ever seen the parts of a watch formed and 
put together ! Yet every possessor of a watch is sure that it 
had a maker; and this conviction could not be strengthened 
by his going to Geneva and seeing watches made by hand, or 
to Waltham and seeing them made by machinery. 
The first maker of a watch had no “experience ” to follow. 
He used his own inventive skill. The watch existed in his 
mind before he shaped it in metal. And when the first watch 
was completed it testified of itself to every observer, of the 
designing mind and the cunning hand which had produced it. 
And this because, as Hume himself says, “ Throw several 
pieces of steel together without shape or form ; they will 
never arrange themselves so as to complete a watch.” This 
is not an inference from the study of such a casual heap of 
steel, but is an immediate and irresistible cognition of the 
human mind. One does not need to trace the loose bits of 
steel from their entrance at one end of the factory to their 
emergence as a completed watch at the other, in order to be 
satisfied that, at some point of their course, a designing hand 
has adjusted them to each other. The perceived adjustment 
