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(1) In digging a well in Illinois, the workmen at a depth of 
several feet struck upon the trunk of a tree, and under this 
upon a bit of copper ore identical with that of Lake Superior. 
The inference was that ages ago the copper had been washed 
from its native bed, and lodged in the alluvium of the Missis- 
sippi valley, — perhaps that the great lakes then had an outlet 
through the Mississippi, — and over this deposit a forest had 
grown, which in time was buried beneath the ever-accumulating 
surface. The whole process was ascribed to natural causes, — 
the interest concentrating in the question of time. (2) In 
working the copper-mines of Lake Superior, the miner came 
upon traces of excavation, of smelting, of rude implements 
of labour; and the immediate convictionwas, Man has been here 
before us, — probably that unknown race who built the mounds 
in the Mississippi valley had discovered and worked these 
mines. How shall we account for the difference in these 
judgments, — the one pointing to Nature, the other to Man ? 
The judgment in each case was spontaneous, and each judg- 
ment is accepted by science as correct. The dividing line 
between them is, that perceived adaptation to an end betokens 
an intelligent purpose directed to that end. A corresponding 
instance is familiar to English geologists. 
At a considerable depth in the delta of the Nile were found 
remains of pottery. The immediate conviction was that man 
was on the soil at the period of this formation. Beyond 
question the pottery was the work of man ; and the geological 
age of the deposit would determine how far back man existed 
on the borders of the Nile. When it was suggested that the 
pottery bore marks of Greek workmanship, the inference was 
that either by accident it had worked its way so deep, or the 
Nile deposit had been more rapid than is commonly supposed. 
The question recurs, how do we make this distinction between 
Man and Nature ? and the answer lies in the one fact of 
adaptation to an end. 
Now, Professor Tyndall assures us that in the single fact of 
light and vision “ we have prodigality of relation and adapta- 
tion.” From the point of view of physical science he cannot 
look beyond the bounds of Nature, and hence he provides the 
intelligence which adaptation demands by persontfi/ing Nature. 
I accept implicitly Tyndall’s testimony to the wondrous fact; 
and not being under the restriction which the pure scientist 
must observe, I accept the conviotion of my own intelligence 
that such intelligence is above Nature. The principle of 
Teleology is thus attested by science itself in its most subtle 
and intricate investigations. Indeed, that principle becomes 
more patent the farther it is removed from the sensuous into 
