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mind, I have written rather for the scientific, questioning, controversial 
mind, not expecting to encounter that here, but thinking that, through 
the publicity that will be given to my paper, some good might be accom- 
plished outside the circle of belief. Let me here say that I doubt very 
much the expediency of neglecting scientific precision, for a phraseology 
suited to the common people. In the end you work mischief in the common 
mind. When, later on, it encounters scepticism, the mind is thrown into 
doubt and confusion, for lack of a more careful and critical training in its 
first notions of science and faith. A popular stylo should be simple and 
clear, but by all means precise. My sole object in the criticism on Paley 
was to call attention to the rule, that in making definitions we should 
exclude from the definition the name of the thing defined ; and my friend 
Mr. Bunting has explained the phrase I have substituted in the place of 
Paley’s axiom. Combination, adjustment, compel the conviction of intelligent 
purpose. (Hear, hear.) I should disclaim most sincerely the compli- 
ments which have been heaped upon me by the speakers this evening, if it 
were not that this would disparage your courtesy. As I sat here I have 
wondered why in the world I ever brought my poor coals to this great 
Newcastle ; and then it dawned upon me that the glimmering of my coal-gas 
had given occasion for the exhibition of the dazzling electric lights which 
have flashed upon us, and that therefore I have been the unconscious 
author of great benefit to the Institute. As to the question of “ force,” I am 
sure I never entertained but have always combated the notion of God’s 
direct and immediate agency in every phenomenon of nature. My thought 
was simply that the tiling which is called “ force ” by scientists, is not a 
thing thoy can put their finger on ; it is a mere name, used as a substitute 
for ignorance ; that it is only a quality of the “ something.” I do not 
say it is always a mark of the same intelligence, but of an intelligence, and 
therefore, am not led into what is a very different and absurd conclusion ; — • 
I mean the one which Dr. Irons combated. This brings me to what Mr. 
Bunting said : we must here bring in the principles of ontology, and also the 
principles of logic ; that when you have found a sufficient cause for a thing, 
there you can stop. I beg to remind you of what I said in my paper, 
that it was not my purpose to make out proof of a God from the evidence 
of a final cause in nature, but, putting aside difficulties which had arisen in 
the past, to indicate the line of direction which our thoughts must take if 
we are to retain this argument at all. I am very firm in the conviction that 
we must recover from the purely physical assumption of scientists — men for 
whom I have profound respect — we must recover for metaphysics certain 
terms which they claim as exclusively their own. They are not the only men 
who know. (Hear, hear.) I know, and one thing I know is that I am. 
And this is not a matter of external observation. My eyes have been 
deceived very much oftener than my conceptions have been mistaken . 
I maintain that it is a fact that I exist ; as positive a fact as that the earth 
existed before me. There is a proper science of mind ; — a science of facts 
and of laws. In this sphere we are to seek for Cause, behind all observable 
VOL. XIII. M 
