159 
REMARKS UPON PROFESSOR HUXLEY’S “HUME”; BY 
DR. THOMPSON. 
Since the foregoing Paper was read, Professor Huxley has published a 
Life of Hume, with an analysis of his works, which in its cheap and 
attractive form may give a fresh impulse to the popularity of the Scotch 
philosopher. A review of Hume’s philosophical system, as a whole, would 
here be out of place. Supposing Huxley’s synopsis of it to be now at hand, 
I must restrict myself to the points raised in my paper — Cause, Power, 
Intuition. It is a hopeful sign that such a master in physics as Pro- 
fessor Huxley should invoke such a master in metaphysics as Hume (just 
as Prof. Tyndall invokes Lucretius) in support of his own teachings ; that 
Science, which we have been told was the only knowledge — the knowledge 
of things by observation of the senses — should have recourse to Philosophy 
to sift and classify phenomena under ideas, in order that they may have a 
place in the category of knowledge. The necessity for this I have endea- 
voured to show in the article, “ What is Science ? ” in the “ British Quarterly 
Review” for January, 1879 ; and the recognition of this dependence of 
science upon philosophy for its own expression would put an end to much 
of the controversy over physics and metaphysics. As to ideal speculation, 
Professor Huxley goes quite far enough. On page 55 he says, “ All science 
starts with hypotheses — in other words, with assumptions that are improved, 
while they may be, and often are, erroneous ; but which are better than 
nothing to the seeker after order in the maze of phenomena. And the 
historical progress of every science depends on the criticism of hypotheses, 
on the gradual stripping off, that is, of their untrue or superfluous parts, 
until there remains only that exact verbal expression of as much as we know 
of the fact, and no more, which constitutes a perfect scientific theory.” 
This statement of the way of attaining a scientific knowledge of external 
phenomena raises two questions, which must be answered before we can 
have any confidence in such knowledge. Who or what is it which makes 
that “ criticism of hypotheses ” upon which “ the progress of every science 
depends” ? And how do we “ know a fact,” or who are the We who know 
a fact, so as to reduce it to its “ exact verbal expression ” ? 
Professor Huxley is not quite satisfied with Hume’s negation of mind ; 
that “ what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different 
perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though 
falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.” Of this 
view, Huxley says, “ He [Hume] may be right or wrong ; but the most he, 
or anybody else, can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know 
nothing more of the mind than that it is a scries of perceptions.” Here, 
again, I ask, Who or what are the We, who know this, or anything else ? 
