160 
Does a mere “ series of perceptions,” each of which gives place in turn to its 
successor, know itself as a series, and that this series is all that can be known 
of mind ? Has a series of ever-changing, ever-vanishing impressions a 
continuity of consciousness, a power of retention as memory, and of dis- 
crimination as judgment ? There can be no criticism without comparison, 
without remembrance, without selection, without discriminating judgment ; 
and the question forces itself home to the school of Hume, If the mind “ is 
nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions,” where or what is 
that faculty which examines and compares these impressions, and which reduces 
them to an “ exact verbal expression” as fact or knowledge ? The truth is that 
Mr. Hume and Professor Huxley necessarily assume a something within man 
which, though it cannot be known “ by d irect observation,” yet knows itself, and 
knows other things. The existence of this something, which we call mind, 
is asserted by the consciousness of all mankind and in the language of 
every people. It is proved by the consciousness which every man has 
of personal identity and of individuality ; by his exercise of memory and 
of will ; and above all by his sense of right and wrong, and his sponta- 
neous emotions in view of good or of evil. This something knows 
itself as a Cause, as a Power, and as possessing free will ; that is, in all 
actions having a moral quality it has power to choose a course of action 
and also power to choose the contrary. Whatever the motive which 
finally determines its choice — say, if you please, the greatest apparent 
good — there is always the power of contrary choice. Every man knows 
these things to be true of himself. But it is absolutely impossible to predi- 
cate any of these things of a mere “series of perceptions.” Though the 
existence and the properties of mind may “ lie beyond the reach of observa- 
tion,” — as the term observation is applied to the study of nature, — yet the 
existence of mind is known in consciousness with a certainty as absolute as 
that which pertains to the phenomena of nature observed and reported 
through the senses. In either case the conviction of certainty is given in 
the mind, or it could not exist at all. How can I know anything if I do 
not first know the I who knows, so far as to have full confidence in the 
observations which I make, and in the judgments which I form 1 
Now, there are also truths which the mind knows by intuition, of 
which it is as certain as of any fact ascertained by observation, and 
indeed as certain as of its own existence. Such truths do not depend 
upon experience but are assumed in all experience. They could not be 
made a whit more clear or certain by reasoning or observation than 
they are seen to be by direct cognition. Of this class of truths arc the 
axioms of mathematics. Hume admits that there are “ necessary truths,” 
but he would not class with these the axiom of causation, “ That whatever 
event has a beginning must have a cause.” Professor Huxley is more 
inclined to class causation with necessary truths, and this upon scientific 
grounds. Thus, on p. 121, he says, “The scientific investigator who notes 
a new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, but he will, without 
