upon as an encroachment on the province of the Deity as 
Creator of the world. Still less could the extinction of force 
be so looked upon. But however this may be, the true in- 
ference from the application of the principle to molecular 
motion is, that man, and a fortiori other animals, cannot 
originate or extinguish force, or (if the expression be better 
liked), cannot create or annihilate it; but not that God has no 
such power. Before the latter inference could be drawn, it 
must be assumed that there is no Creator, which is the actual 
question in dispute. And this is, in fact, the assumption 
which underlies all the arguments against belief in a personal 
Creator that are founded upon the uniformity of nature. 
12. Dr. Tyndall, in his Belfast Address, calls the will of a 
Deity, caprice ; which, with those who do not exercise much 
thought, might pass for an argument. In this meeting it is 
unnecessary to say that Christians do not ascribe caprice to 
the God in whom they believe. They hold that “the Judge 
of all the earth will do right 33 — will act on principles of right 
and justice. They believe, with St. Paul, that in justifying 
repentant sinners, He does not act on a mere impulse of 
mercy, but that He is both “just, and the justifier of him 
which believeth in Jesus 33 (Rom. iii. 26). And St. Paul says 
again : “ Is God unrighteous, who taketh vengeance ? . . . . 
God forbid ; for then how shall God judge the world ? 33 
(Rom. iii. 5, 6). That is to say. He punishes, not for the 
mere gratification of His anger — in other words, not from 
caprice — but on principle, and with a regard to justice. The 
assertion, therefore, of Dr. Tyndall, that “ science demands 
the radical extirpation of caprice,^ may be assented to. But 
it is a glaring fallacy as applied to the God of the Christian. 
Dr. Tyndall asserts throughout — asserts, but, so far as I can 
see, never proves — that science leaves no room for will. 
Nature, he says, is uniform, therefore will is excluded. Here 
we have a major premise and a conclusion ; but where is the 
minor premise ? By his own admission, the will of man can 
interfere in the distribution of the forces of nature. This he 
can do by the power which, within limits, he has over matter : 
and his power over matter external to himself is exerted 
through his bodily movements, and these movements are 
effected by the efforts of his will. Thus, in the last resort, 
material forces are distributed through the power of mind 
over matter. And if the mind of man has power over matter, 
much more may the Divine mind have such power. This a 
fortiori argument can only be met by denying that there is a 
Divine mind — th e petitio principii already referred to. Thus 
it is, I think, fairly made out that there is no reason to ques- 
