59 
it is not a conclusive one. “ Those,” he says (p. 35) “ who 
cannot conceive a self- existent universe, and who therefore 
assume a creator as the source of the universe, take for granted 
that they can conceive a self-existent creator. . . . But they 
delude themselves.” That any thing or being should be self- 
existent he had a little before pronounced to be impossible, 
because inconceivable. His words are (p. 31) : “ Self-existence 
. . . necessarily means existence without a beginning ; and to 
form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception 
of existence without a beginning. How, by no mental effort 
can we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past 
time implies the conception of infinite past time, which is an 
impossibility.” Surely, the weakness of this argument is at 
once apparent. It contains the latent assumption that what- 
ever we are unable to conceive is in itself impossible — an 
assumption whose falsity is nowhere more clearly brought out 
than in the present instance. For if we are unable to con- 
ceive infinite past time, we are just as unable to conceive finite 
past time ; and if the argument were sound in the one case 
it would be equally sound in the other — that is to say, if infinite 
past time be impossible, because inconceivable by us, finite 
past time is impossible for the same reason. Therefore past 
time is neither finite nor infinite, which is a glaring contradic- 
tion. Mr. Spencer’s argument against self-existence, and so 
against a self-existent Creator, being thus, as I believe, shown 
to be fallacious by its involving a contradiction, the objection 
to the universe having been created by external agency, which 
he has built up upon it, falls to the ground. 
22. Mr. Spencer’s next argument against the doctrine that 
the universe was created is derived from the supposed inde- 
structibility of matter. This he calls a “ physical axiom.” 
But if we adopt his description of physical axioms, we must, 
I think, arrive at the conclusion that these are different from 
all other axioms, or rather, that they ought not to be called 
axioms at all, but should be denoted by a different word. An 
“ axiom ” is generally the word used to express a self-evident 
proposition — a proposition so evident that (according to the 
etymology of the word) an opponent in argument has a right 
to demand assent to it. But physical axioms, according to 
Mr. Spencer, are of quite a different character. He describes 
them as follows : — “There are necessary truths in physics, for 
the apprehension of which ... a developed and disciplined 
intelligence is required; and before such intelligence arises, 
not only may there be failure to apprehend the necessity of 
them, but there may be vague beliefs in their contraries. ITp 
to comparatively recent times, all mankind v/ere in this state 
