much in it that offers an extreme temptation to comment on, although 
I do not think that I at least could improve a paper that is so 
clearly and lucidly put. There are, however, one or two things I 
should like briefly to call attention to as being, in my opinion, very 
important, and which I only touch upon, on the principle of com- 
mending what has been said to the careful re-reading of those who have 
heard the paper read, and to the careful perusal, also, of those members of 
the Institute who, although not present, will receive a copy of the paper. 
I would first refer to the immense importance of what has been so well put, 
as to conceivability not being a measure of knowledge. It is perfectly true 
that the discipline of human intelligence is of immense value ; and it is 
true that the opinions of men like Tyndall, Huxley, and Herbert Spencer, 
are of great value in proof of the positive of matters coming within their 
own line of thought. If Huxley, Darwin, or Professor Tyndall say 
they can conceive a thing, we may well consider that the thing is probably 
conceivable ; but to conceive a negative is so extraordinary that one can hardly 
imagine how these able thinkers can suppose that the inability to do so 
disproves anything. It has been well put in the paper that the later propo- 
sitions of Euclid are not less true because they require a trained intellect 
to appreciate them. Surely most of us have had schoolfellows who have 
shown an utter inability to understand the propositions in the first book, 
and who, in fact, have gone far to disprove them, if it be true that inability 
to conceive a thing can prove a negative. There are many people who are 
totally unable to conceive the differential and integral calculus ; but this 
does not amount to anything like a disproof of the propositions involved. 
On the contrary, we should rather be disposed to say of them that the fact 
that other people can conceive these things proves that such things are ; 
and why, I ask, should we not apply the same argument to those unbelievers 
who say they are unable to conceive the existence of a Divinity, and that, 
therefore, there is no Divinity ? I should say, “ Does not this prove the 
imperfection of your faculty of conception, rather than the non-existence 
of a Deity V 9 A man may have the keenest ear for music, so as to be 
able to detect a subdivision of a semitone, which nine people out of ten are 
utterly unable to perceive, but that does not prove that he has a 
correct eye for colour, as he may be colour-blind. I have known 
men who are unable to perceive the difference between green and red — 
who were such excellent musicians, that they could readily detect 
a difference between two sounds that was far beyond my perception. 
To put it in this way : as a man affected with Daltonism can conceive 
no difference between red and green, so there are people who are affected 
with a spiritual Daltonism which prevents their being able to conceive 
of the Creator. Do not let us forget the statement that if any man will 
do His will he shall know. The close connection between the action of the 
will and the power of the intellect is one of those things that are far beyond 
our ability to understand, and which cannot be measured by our powers 
of understanding. I am very glad the paper read to-night has so clearly and 
