81 
But the question which cannot, in the long run, be evaded, is that which is 
raised under the term “ spontaneity/’ and it lies, I believe, immediately before 
us. Is there in the universe no “ originating ” ? This is not a question that, 
will bear to be superficially disposed of. Our own responsibility, as moral 
beings, is no less involved in it than the Divine origination and government 
of all things ; nor can we ultimately defend the one without the other. 
Theologians, as well as philosophers, have too long turned aside from con- 
sidering what the idea of creation or origination implies, when contemplated 
in the past (as “ before the world began ”), or, when contemplated now, in the 
intelligent agent of variously limited power. The universe has abundant 
signs now of veiled power, — a being that quickens. It is this that we have 
to contemplate. Pre-phenomenal power, with the “contingency’’ really 
involved in its acting with any freedom, must be re-considered from the very 
root of the subject. There is no modesty or reverence in refusing to examine 
it. “ Kinetic and potential energy,” as they are called — (that is, an energy that 
moves, and an energy that is able to move), — open the whole question in 
physics ; as really as “ responsibility ’’ opens it in the region of thought. 
That which has to be accounted for is the beginning of any change (whether 
there be known materials for the agent to act on or not). Too long have 
current and inherited theories as to “ necessity,” “ fate,” and “ prescience ” 
been stumbling-blocks in the way of the approach of the scientific mind — the 
Cliffords and the Spensers — to the truths of our Divine Keligion. We 
cannot, e.g ., in any true philosophy, separate between the reality of agency 
in some cases, and not in others, on the ground that some agents are more 
powerful than others, or than the Highest or Supreme Agent who transcends 
all. Beal agency, operating de novo, whether in the regions of thought, or 
in the field of the phenomenal, must be estimated in one and the same 
philosophy ; and I differ widely, therefore, from one section (18) in to- 
night’s paper, which says, “ We are at liberty to describe the will of God as 
spontaneity, whatever we may think of the will of man.” The former is, 
perhaps, the more difficult ; as Billuart says, it is the “ hardest knot in 
all theology.” The truth is, that man who is “ made in the image of 
God,” has common cause herein with the Divine Father. We are not at 
liberty to ignore our human spontaneity. It is vital to religion, to morality, 
to free thought ; and, unhappily, we have been afraid of examining it. Bishop 
Butler said that it was practically of no consequence which way the question 
of spontaneity and necessity was decided. But it is the introduction 
of poison into the system of men’s thought when they admit false philo- 
sophy. Happily we are so constituted that the sense of responsibility is inde- 
structible in our nature, and the conviction of a retributive justice can never 
be rooted out of us. They are “ facts of human nature.” Nevertheless, there 
is a great wrong that has been done to this generation, in the misdirection 
of its philosophy of duty by quasi- religious theories in harmony -with, if not 
leading to, materialism. 
VOL. XV. 
G 
