different ideas. There is no necessary connexion between an 
idea and the word that represents it. It is as arbitrary as our 
making the sign I symbolize the idea of unity, or the sign = the 
idea of equivalence.” 
Here the question turns upon the meaning of “necessary 
connexion ” ; there is a connexion of some kind between that- 
which-is-representative and that-which-it-represents, for a word 
is a sign, and a sign, as M. Taine has acutely observed, is “ a 
present experience, which suggests to us the idea of a possible 
experience.” If by “ necessary ” is meant “ abstract,” it may 
be admitted that in the abstract one name is equally as 
destitute of, or as replete with, meaning as another. We are 
not, however, dealing with the abstract but with actual concrete 
circumstance, and Prof. Sayce’s illustrations throw still greater 
doubt upon his meaning. For he says that the connexion is 
as arbitrary as, e.g., making the sign = represent the idea of 
equivalence. But what degree of arbitrariness is there in so 
doing ? Surely, two short and equal straight lines represent this 
idea very naturally. On the other hand, we might fairly call it 
arbitrary to represent equivalence by two unequal lines. There 
is evidently a certain degree of arbitrariness in the matter, e.g., 
perpendicular lines might have been employed ; and, therefore, 
by corollary, a certain degree of connexion. 
Prof. Sayce continues, — “ There is no reason in the nature of 
things [the abstract ?] why the word booh should represent what 
we mean when we look at the present volume ; it might just as 
well be denoted by biblion or liber” 
Let us, forgetting the connexion between booh (Old English 
boc, “a beech-tree”) and beechen tablets, between liber and the 
inner bark of trees, between biblion and the inner coats of the 
papyrus (a book being named from its material stuff), admit 
that they are equally good names ; that the Aryan hwan, the 
Semitic halb, the Hamitic tesem, and the Turanian lih, are 
equally suitable names for the dog. From such an admission, 
the deduction is frequently, but most incorrectly, drawn that 
any sound-name would have been, or be, equally suitable. Yet, 
as we have seen, miau would have been intrinsically inappro- 
priate. Prof. Sayce observes that : — 
“ The origin of language is to be sought in gestures, onoma- 
topoeia, and, to a limited extent, interjeetional cries.” If it 
comes from these three sources, the words “ to a limited extent ” 
apply equally to each source ; and he then notices that inter- 
jectional cries are universally practically the same, like play of 
feature, that the same gestures are for the most part understood 
by different races in the same way, and that language can be 
traced back to a few and simple elements. As to interjec- 
