13 
to be inconsistent with a fact stated in tbe Old or New Testa- 
ment, the latter is coolly pronounced to be erroneous. I 
propose to offer a few observations on this subject, limiting 
myself to objections of a physical or metaphysical character, 
and to but a few even of these, as our time is short. 
2. I took occasion, in a paper which I had the honour to 
read to this Society in last June, to refer to Professor TyndalTs 
oft-repeated assertion (made at the Midland Institute, at 
Birmingham, in 1877, and also on other occasions) that the 
principle of conservation of energy in the world of matter 
leaves no room for spontaneity to mingle with what he assumes 
to be the necessary play of the forces of nature. The only 
thing like a reason which he gives for this is, that man^s power 
over nature is not creative, but only distributive. It is, how- 
ever, easily seen that this is no reason at all. No one believes 
that man has any creative power over nature. What the 
theist maintains is, that (not man, but) God, has a creative 
power over nature ; and this position is not in the least affected 
by Dr. TyndalTs observations. It is true that he calls the 
play of the natural forces which may convey the idea 
that the Deity has no more creative will than man ; but he 
gives no proof that such is the case. He quietly assumes it, as 
indeed he is compelled to do, there being in fact no proof of it 
possible. In the Appendix, Note A, will be found some re- 
marks lately communicated to me in a letter by one to whom, 
I doubt not, the members of this Society will be ready to pay 
attention — the Eev. T. Eomney Kobinson, D.D., Professor of 
Astronomy at Armagh, and which he has kindly permitted me 
to make use of on the present occasion. * 
3. The real question is. How did the forces of nature 
originate ? To say that they are self-created is a contradiction. 
It means that they acted before they existed, which is absurd. 
They must therefore either be self-existent, or created by 
external agency, these being the only other suppositions 
possible. And the supposition of creation by external agency 
implies also self-existence, since the Creator must either be self- 
existent, or must owe His existence, more or less remotely, 
to a self-existent Being. The question, then, lies between a 
self-existent Creator, and a seff-existent phenomenal universe. 
Those who believe in the latter have to encounter a similar diffi- 
culty to that of those who believe in an intelligent Creator. If 
they ask us. How came God to exist ? we ask them in turn. 
How, without God, came matter and force to exist? Philo- 
* See Appendix A. 
