14 
sophy, unaided by any other source of knowledge, is as little 
able to answer one of these questions as the other. 
4. But an objection is sometimes made, on metaphysical 
grounds, to the very idea of creation. It implies, it is said, a 
First Cause, which is inconsistent with the idea of an absolute 
Being, such as God must be supposed to be, because an abso- 
lute being has no relation to anything, and, therefore, a being 
between whom and the universe there is the relation of cause 
and effect, cannot be an absolute being. To my own mind, if 
I may venture to say it, metaphysical arguments which deal 
with the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, are not 
very convincing. Even in the most certain of the sciences — 
mathematics — we find that we are out of our depth when we 
arrive at infinities. We cannot, therefore, expect to grapple 
with infinities in regions less sure and definite. Dean Mansel, 
in his Limits of Beligious Thought,^^ takes this view. He 
observes, that the contradictions to which we seem to be 
conducted by such speculations manifest themselves in o^;po- 
site directions. They are analogous to those in which we find 
ourselves involved when we endeavour to contemplate space 
and time in all their generality. We cannot conceive either 
space or time as finite, because, however far we extend them 
in idea, we can find no bounds to them. Neither, on the 
other hand, can we conceive them as infinite, because our 
minds cannot grasp infinity. That we are in a similar strait 
when we try to reason about the First Cause, the Absolute, 
and the Infinite, Dean Mansel shows in the work just referred 
to. The contradictions, he observes, are apparent, not real ; 
and he thus distinguishes between apparent and real contra- 
dictions. The latter (the real) are one-sided, and necessitate 
a belief in the opposite direction ; the former are two-sided, 
and appear to press equally in opposite directions, from both 
of which together we find it impossible to exclude behef. 
Thus, to take an example of the unilateral (one-sided) kind, I 
find a contradiction in the conception of a circular square, and 
I cannot believe in its possible existence ; but then, on the 
other hand, I am compelled to believe that every existing 
square is n,ot circular. Whereas, to take an example of the 
bi-lateral (two-sided) kind, I find a seeming contradiction in 
the conception of an absolutely first or last moment of time ; 
yet I find it impossible to believe that neither of these can be 
true, and I find it equally impossible to believe that both can 
be true. The reason of this distinction is obvious. The 
former class of contradictions exists between attributes, both 
of which are within the limits of positive thought. To consti- 
tute a real contradiction, it is necessary that we should have 
