26 
lation should be given, we have taken into account the 
necessity that it should be accompanied by miracles. For, 
otherwise, this might destroy the probability of a revelation. 
If, for example, miracles were utterly incredible (as Hume 
supposes), the fact that a revelation cannot be given without 
them, so far from imparting to the miracles the probability 
which would otherwise attach to the revelation, w’ould make 
the revelation itself incredible. It would be what logicians 
call a destructive conditional syllogism, in which the major 
premise states the sequence of one proposition (denominated 
the consequent) from another (called the antecedent). If the 
minor premise denies the consequent, the syllogism is destruc- 
tive, and the rule is that the conclusion must deny the 
antecedent. Or if the minor premise is constructive, i.e., if it 
affirms the antecedent, the conclusion must affirm the conse- 
quent. Put in this form, the major premise in the present 
case is, — If a revelation be credible, miracles are 
credible.-’^ Hume would take for the minor premise the 
proposition — Miracles are not credible ; from which, if 
it were true, the conclusion would necessarily be, that ^‘^a 
revelation is not credible.^^ Paley, on the other hand, would 
take for his minor premise — a revelation is credible,^ ^ 
the conclusion from which would be that miracles are 
credible.^' How, as this conclusion is in direct contradiction 
to Hume^s minor premise, it is incumbent on Paley to show 
that the latter is false. This he does afterwards in the manner 
already described, and therefore I think he may fairly be 
looked upon as having made out his case. But until he had 
shown Hume’s objection to be without foundation, his syllogism, 
formally stated, could not be considered conclusive. This is 
the only thing approaching to a flaw that has, so far as I am 
aware, been discovered in Paley’s Evidences, but it is only one 
in form. Substantially his reasoning is unanswerable. It has 
lately become fashionable with some to decry Paley and Butler, 
and other books which deal with the evidences of Christianity 
as antiquated, and unsuited to the advanced theories of our 
own time. This seems to be for no other reason than because 
they argue the question so clearly and unanswerably as to 
dispel the vague mistiness in which those advanced theories 
are shrouded. And I venture strongly to recommend all whom 
my words may reach, to peruse these books, if they should not 
have already done so, and make themselves thoroughly 
acquainted with the reasonings they contain. This will be the 
most effectual means of guarding themselves against being 
lost in the quagmires of a pretentious and hollow scepticism. 
