59 
otlier fact. vSomeliow this seems to have escaped the notice 
of many who have criticised his writings^ and he is commonly 
believed to uphold something like Materialism. G-reater error_, 
however, there can hardly be. Materialism has never before 
had such a powerful and uncompromising opponent, and it is 
hardly probable that it can ever again make head against his 
attacks. The doctrine of the absolute immateriality of Mind is 
a structural part of his philosophy, and one which is simply 
invaluable to those who see the spiritual aspect of things. He 
states the doctrine over and over again. On this point the 
following passages amongst others are surely conclusive : — 
In First Principles,^^ the entire chapter on The Data of 
Philosophy is devoted to showing that the verdict of con- 
sciousness as to the existence of the self and the not-self must 
be accepted. He thus sums up the whole : — 
What is this datum, or rather what are these data, which 
philosophy cannot do without ? Clearly one primordial datum 
is involved in the foregoing statement. Already by implica- 
tion we have assumed, and must for ever continue to assume, 
that congruities and incongruities exist, and are cognisable by 
us. We cannot avoid accepting as true the verdict of con- 
sciousness that some manifestations are like one another, and 
some are unlike one another. 
On the next page, he says : — 
Consequently the assumption that a congruity or an 
incongruity exists when consciousness testifies to it, is an 
inevitable assumption. It is useless to say, as Sir W. Hamilton 
does, that consciousness is to be deemed trustworthy until 
proved mendacious. It cannot be proved mendacious in this, 
its fundamental act ; since, as we see, proof involves a complete 
acceptance of this primordial act. Nay, more, the very thing 
supposed to be proved cannot be expressed without recognising 
this primordial act as valid; since unless we accept the verdict 
of consciousness that they differ, mendacity and trustworthi- 
ness become identical. Process and product of reasoning 
both disappear in the absence of this assumption. ■’■’f 
Thus we see he asserts that the process asserted as valid 
by consciousness must be accepted. He next proceeds to 
show that the 'product given by consciousness must also be 
accepted. 
He analyses all that is given by consciousness, and divides 
it into two great classes. He then says : — 
What is the division [into these classes] equivalent to ? 
* First Principles^ second edition (from which all quotations in this 
paper are made), p. 140. t Ibid., p. 141. 
