60 
Obviously ifc corresponds to tlie division between object and 
subject. This profoundest of distinctions among the manifesta- 
tions of the Unknowable [by Unknowable he means 
Matter and Mind^^] ^^we recognise by grouping them into 
self and not-self/^* 
A few lines further on he continues : — 
The persistent consciousness of likeness or difference is 
one which, by its very persistence, makes itself accepted; 
and one which transcends scepticism, since without it even 
doubt becomes impossible. And the primordial division of 
self from not-self is a cumulative result of persistent con- 
sciousnesses of likenesses and differences among manifes- 
tations. 
He closes the chapter by saying : — 
So much, then, for the data of philosophy. In common 
with religion, philosophy assumes the primordial implication 
of consciousness, which, as we saw in the last part, has the 
deepest of all foundations. It assumes the validity of a certain 
primordial process of consciousness, without which inference 
is impossible, and without which there cannot even be either 
aflSrmation or denial. And it assumes the validity of a certain 
'pYimordisil p7’oduct of consciousness, which, though it originates 
in an earlier process, is also, in one sense, a product of this 
process, since by this process it is tested and stamped as 
genuine.^^J 
The chapter is again summed up in the Principles of 
Psychology in these words : — 
In the second part of ‘ First Principles,^ 'when dealing 
with the Data of Philosophy, it was sho'wn that the co-existence 
of subject and object is a deliverance of consciousness which, 
taking precedence of all analytic examination, but subse- 
quently verified by analytic examination, is a truth transcending 
all others in certainty.'’^ § 
Statements of similar import, some of which are quoted on 
the next page, occur at intervals throughout the Philosophy. 
What has now been adduced must surely prove that Mr. 
Spencer asserts, as clearly as words can assert, the absolute 
validity of the simple deliverances of consciousness, as regards 
the co-existence of subject and object. It might still, however, 
be contended that he regards both subject and object. Mind 
and Matter, as only fleeting phenomena, with no distinct 
* First Principles, p. 154. f Ibid., p. 154. X Ibid., p. 157. 
§ Principles of Psychology, second edition (from ’«'hich all quotations are 
made), vol. i. p. 209. 
