03 
One of the speakers took exception to my statement that “ the systems of 
philosophy encountered by St. Paul were, compared with this system, but as 
unproved assertions to the deductions of exact science,” and he cites the 
works of Aristotle as exact and severe deductions. In reply I would say 
that I am not aware that St. Paul conflicted with Aristotle. There was 
much in the old systems which was true, which could be at once accepted. 
What was not true was only mere flimsy speculation, and had no solid argu- 
ment to back it. But in Mr. Spencer’s system we meet with what seems, 
and often is, severe scientific reasoning, leading up to a conclusion opposed 
by Kevelation, — i.e., from premisses the truth of which we are forced to grants 
we are led by exact logic to a conclusion from which ice recoil. St. Paul, so 
far as I know, never met a case of this sort. The only parallel instance is 
St. Stephen, and it needed his glorious Defence in order to make evident to 
men where the sophism lay. 
Keference has been made to the indefinite'^ nature of the phrase the 
Doctrine of Evolution,” and questions have been raised as to the area over 
which it is accepted. I understand the phrase to mean the doctrine that all 
the different orders and genera of the animated world have been evolved, — 
some say, with a few breaks ; some, without any break, — from one primary 
root, the whole world of life being one organic whole ; one class of animals 
growing out of another class as the branches and twigs grow out of the 
trunk of a tree. Now that this doctrine, with various slight modifications, 
is held by the majority of the leading men of science in all countries of the 
globe, seems to me a fairly ascertained fact. In Dublin a scientific man 
told me that three-fourths of those he knew held it. I have heard similar 
statements elsewhere. I am told it was almost universally accepted at 
Cambridge ten years ago. Professor Huxley, on the Jubilee of Darwinism, 
said that it had now made good its claims to rule the scientific world, and 
must henceforth be regarded as the only tenable hypothesis yet propounded. 
I think these authorities fairly justify my statement. 
Permit me to thank Prebendary Irons very warmly for the exceedingly 
kind and appreciative way in which he has spoken of my paper. There is 
just one little point where I do not understand Spencer to have the fault 
attributed to him. Mr. Spencer denies that we can conceive of something 
having been made out of nothing. This Dr. Irons combats. I understand 
Mr. Spencer here to mean, with Sir William Hamilton, that the act of 
creation is by us incomprehensible. Now, to conceive or comprehend the 
act of creation would be to link together in our thought two propositions — 
something ; nothing — one of which — nothing — cannot come into thought at 
all. No effort of ours can bridge over the logical chasm between something 
and 0. Hence the act of creation can never be thought. We can trace 
the Divine Power in creation from the moment it comes into sight and 
becomes something, but we cannot pass into that region, to be traversed by 
Deity alone, whence the power issued. As Hamilton showed, we can 
* 
* See Chairman’s remarks, p. 82. 
