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principle, and it is manifestly a dictate of common sense. A 
recent writer contends that Mr. Spencer^ s metaphysical 
principles are empirical By this he can only mean that 
because Mr. Spencer shows that the Logical Laws are the slow 
growth in us, through unnumbered organisms, of much humbler 
elements of Mind, therefore they have been acquired by and 
are the result of the experience of those organisms. In my 
judgment such an argument is neither sound nor just, and it 
admits of a most effective rejoinder. Mr. Spencer may reply 
that, so far from deriving those Logical Laws from experience, 
he is, on the contrary, showing that they are the simple out- 
growth of the one a priori principle which runs throughout 
the universe ; he is showing that their roots stretch far away 
down, deeper than all things ; he is assigning them an anti- 
quity compared with which the date the Professor aflBxes 
makes them but of mushroom growth, and is giving them an 
authority which makes his a priori canon nothing more than 
their humble vassal. 
So much Mr. Spencer might say on the ground of his 
synthetic system alone. But when in addition, in his analytic 
system, he expressly sets aside all possible rivals of the simple 
deliverances of consciousness, and proclaims his adhesion to 
consciousness alone, then it seems to me only fair and just to 
accept his disclaimer, and to regard his system as an honest 
attempt to found only on consciousness. The a priori is his 
structural element ; his metaphysics are not empirical. 
We have now to examine his Theory of the Will. He denies 
to the Will all moral freedom, taking up the position of the 
philosophical necessarian. Now, if Consciousness could be 
clearly shown to assert that we have a sense of moral Liberty, 
Mr. Spencer could be proved to contradict Consciousness on 
this point. No doubt some of the greatest philosophers, 
including Kant, Jacobi, Hamilton, contend that Consciousness 
does give us this sense of Freedom, and they attach to it the 
greatest possible importance. But others as strenuously deny 
it, and there is no more vexed question in all Philosophy. Leav- 
ing this, then, for the present at least, let us look at Mr. 
SpencePs reasoning on the matter. 
Now, if Consciousness really asserts that we are morally 
free, there must be some break in Mr. SpencePs logical 
chain, since he asserts the exact contradictory. If, then, on 
examination we find such a break, it will so far be an evidence 
that Consciousness does make the assertion., and we shall then 
* Professor Fairbairn, Contemporary JReview for July. 
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