102 
It is alike true that he determined the action, and that the aggregate of his 
feelings and ideas determined it ; since, during its existence, this aggregate 
constituted his then state of consciousness, that is, himself. Either the ego, 
Avhich is supposed to determine or will the action, is present in conscious- 
ness or it is not. If it is not present in consciousness, it is something of 
which we are unconscious — something, therefore, of whose existence we neither 
have nor can have any evidence. If it is present in consciousness, then, as it is 
ever present, it can be at each moment nothing else than the state of con- 
sciousness, simple or compound, passing at that moment. It follows, inevi- 
tably, that when an impression, received from without, makes nascent certain 
appropriate motor changes, and various of the feelings* and ideas which must 
accompany and foUow them ; and when, under the stimulus of this composite 
psychical state, the nascent motor changes pass in actual motor changes ; 
this composite psychical state, which excites the action, is, at the same time, 
the ego which is said to will the action. Naturally enough, then, the subject 
of such psychical changes says that he wills the action ; since, psychically 
considered, he is at that moment nothing more than the composite state of 
consciousness by which the action is excited. But to say that the performance 
of the action is, therefore, the result of his free wiU, is to say that he determines 
the cohesions of the psychical states which arouse the action ; and, as these 
psychical states constitute himself at that moment, this is to say that these 
psychical states determine their own cohesions, which is absurd. Their 
cohesions have been determined by experiences — the greater part of them 
constituting what we call his natural character, by the experiences of ante- 
cedent organisms ; and the rest by his own experiences. The changes which 
at each moment take place in his consciousness, and among others those 
which he is said to will, are produced by this infinitude of previous expe- 
riences registered in his nervous structure, co-operating with the immediate 
impressions on his senses : the effects of these combined factors being in 
every case qualified by the physical state, general or local, of his organism. 
This subjective illusion, in which the notion of free-will commonly origi- 
V nates, is strengthened by a corresponding objective illusion. The actions of 
other individuals, lacking as they do that imiformity characterising pheno- 
mena of which the laws are known, appear to be lawless — appear to be under 
no necessity of following any particular order ; and are hence supposed to be 
determined by the unknown independent something called the Will. But 
this seeming indeterminateness in the mental succession is consequent on the 
extreme complication of the forces in action. The composition of causes is 
so intricate, and from moment to moment so varied, that the effects are not 
calculable. These effects are, however, as conformable to law as the simplest 
reflex actions. The irregularity and apparent freedom are inevitable results 
of the complexity, and equally arise in the inorganic world under parallel 
conditions. To amplify an illustration before used : — A body in space, sub- 
ject to the attraction of a single other body, moves in a direction that can be 
accurately predicted. If subject to the attractions of two bodies, its course 
is but approximately calculable. If subject to the attractions of three 
bodies, its course can be calculated with still less precision. And, if it is 
surrounded by bodies of all sizes at all distances, its motion will be appa- 
rently uninfluenced by any of them : it will move in some indefinable 
varying line that appears to be self-determined : it will seem to be free. 
Similarly, in proportion as the cohesions of each psychical state to others 
become great in number and various in degree, the psychical changes will 
become incalculable and apparently subject to no law. 
* There is evidently some mistake here, but those are the ipsissima verba 
of. Mr. Spencer’s work. 
