103 
To reduce the general question to its simplest form : Psychical changes 
either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this 
work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense ; no 
science of Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there cannot 
be any such thing as free-will.* 
If now we carefully take to pieces tkis tissue of elaborate 
argument, we stall find, I think, that there is hardly one 
sentence in it which does not contain either a glaring mis- 
statement, a palpable fallacy, or a clear petitio principii. Let 
us take the sentences in order. 
1. In sentences two and three he says that ^^the real pro- 
position involved in the dogma of free-will is “ that every 
one is at liberty to desire or not to desire.^^ Now as to 
whether this is a just statement of the problem, we will call 
two witnesses of unimpeachable character — Kant and Hamil- 
ton. Kant says, ^‘^We only mean by liberty that negative 
property of our thinking frame not to be determined to act 
by physical excitements."’^ t Still more clearly he says, ^^The 
instincts of man^s physical nature give birth to obstacles 
which hinder and impede him in the execution of his duty. 
They are, in fact, mighty opposing forces which he has to go 
forth and encounter.^^ { Again he speaks of ^Hhe force reason 
has to vanquish and beat down all the appetites which oppose 
the execution of the law."’^ § Clearly then Kant allows that 
we must desire, but says we have power to rein in our desires. 
Hamilton is just as clear. He speaks of man^s liberty as 
capable of carrying that Law of Duty into effect, in op- 
position to the solicitations, the impulsions of his material 
nature. || A few lines lower he speaks of Liberty as a power 
capable of resisting and conquering the counter-action of our 
animal nature.^^ || Thus Kant and Hamilton admit that we 
are compelled to desire, but they assert that our free-will can 
restrain desire. Mr. Spencer must therefore stand convicted^ 
either of being ignorant of what they held, or else of a de- 
liberate misrepresentation of the question at issue. On either 
supposition he stands convicted of glaring misrepresentation. 
2. In the next sentence — sentence four — there is a fallacy. 
Let it be remembered that Mr. Spencer has to prove that the 
will is not free, and he is now advancing arguments which are 
supposed to prove it. This is his argument. ^^From the 
universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of 
psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which 
Principles of Psychology^ vol. i. pp. 500, 503. 
i'Kant, Metaphysics of Ethics, Calderwood’s ed., p. 174. J Ibid. p. 194. 
§ Ibid. p. 198. II Hamilton, Xechtrcs on Metaph.y sics, \ol.i. 4th ed.,p. 29. 
