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like tlie strange ego lie has conjured up, — the mere phenomena 
of thought without one particle of reality behind it, — this poor 
word-painting, utterly unbecoming a great philosopher, he 
attempts to keep in countenance by an illustration just as 
shallow, just as evasive of the point at issue, just as much a 
piece of mere paint as all that has gone before. No doubt 
those have something on their side who aflBrm that Mr. 
Spencer^s whole system is an empiricism. It must be allowed 
that he has some clay mixed with his iron and his gold. His 
system is not homogeneous. Still, as Homer sometimes nods, 
I, for myself, prefer to appeal from Mr. Spencer, seemingly 
prejudiced, and certainly shallow and inconsistent, to his own 
deeper and grander self, and to hold that that is the true 
philosopher who has led us to found on the solid rock of truth, 
who has proclaimed that the evidence of consciousness 
transcends all other evidences, that the existence of mind is 
one of the most certain of truths. It is his masterly demon- 
stration of these important principles which gives him a claim 
to our reverence and gratitude, and for the sake of these we can 
pass by his failing here. But the complete failure of a logician 
of his grasp to render a worthy reason suggests a very decided 
inference that the truth in the matter is altogether against 
him, and that even he is not powerful enough to bear back 
the overwhelming strength which that truth possesses. 
In showing, then, that Mr. Spencer has not proved the 
bondage of the Will we have made another great chasm in 
his Philosophical system hardly less important than the chasm 
shown in the former paper to exist. Then it was proved, on 
Mr. Spencer^s own showing, that although he allowed Mind 
and Matter to be at opposite poles of the universe, having 
between them a logical chasm which no effort of ours could 
span, he yet did attempt to pass logically from solar rays to 
mental operations, and that his whole system fell in utter chaos 
if this step was impossible. As it was impossible, it was in 
this way shown that all the Mind in the universe remained, on 
his system, quite unaccounted for, and that this omission made 
a yawning gap he could never fill up. We have shown in the 
present Paper that there is a similar hiatus when he attempts 
to pass from Intellect to Will. The continuity of his system 
depends on his showing that Intellect can pass into Will. If 
the reasoning of the present Paper be just, he has advanced 
nothing to show this. All the Will in the universe, then, 
remains on his system unaccounted for. In the next Paper I 
hope to show that his system is equally destitute of any trace 
of Conscience. A System of Philosophy,^^ — an explanation 
of all that is in the universe, — which does not account for any 
