Ill 
of tlie Mind, any of the Will, any of the Conscience, and yet 
claims to account for everything, must speedily lose its hold 
on intelligent men. 
And it seems to me that he has gone a long way, quite 
unintentionally, of course, towards showing that the Will is 
free. As parts of his Philosophy form our most invulnerable 
defence against the attacks of Materialists and Idealists, so it 
may be that he has also supplied some of the most solid argu- 
ments for the Freedom of the Will. We have been assured 
by him that Mind and Matter are at the two opposite poles of 
being. They are x and y, two existences having no factors 
in common ; no one thing being found in the one which is 
also found in the other. I understand his rhetoric to mean or 
to imply that they are logical contradictories, whatever the 
the one has that the other has not. They form a perfect 
series of antitheses, and if they are at the opposite poles of 
being, as he says, I do not see how this conclusion can be 
avoided. If they have any one element in common, there 
surely they can unite, and that element makes a bridge over the 
mighty chasm that divides them. But Mr. Spencer says no 
such bridge is possible; they are the Jews and Samaritans of 
the philosophical world, eschewing all intercourse with each 
other. 
Now if this conception be just, as it seems to me it is, 
surely it must be true that whatever is found in the one will 
not be found in the other. And beyond all question fixed 
causation does obtain in the world of Matter. Everything 
there is held in the iron grip of law. Thus it seems to me 
that such fixed causation cannot obtain in the realm of Mind, 
but that, as the logical contradictory of the law obtaining in 
Matter, the opposite rule, of Freedom, must obtain in the 
realm of Mind. 
It can readily be ascertained whether Mind and Matter are 
logical contradictories in all other things. Certainly they seem 
to be. Matter is extended; Mind is unextended. Matter 
is unintelligent ; Mind is intelligent ; Matter has space rela- 
tions and has weight ; Mind has no space relations and has no 
weight. Matter is capable of motion or of transit in space ; 
Mind, having no space relations, is incapable of motion. It 
seems to me the antitheses might go on ad infinitum. If, 
then, in every other conceivable category of thought Mind 
were the proved antithesis of Matter, that doctrine would 
have but a very precarious hold on a strong intelligence 
which asserted that in this one instance, viz., of bondage to 
fixed law. Mind and Matter were alike. One frail spider^s 
web spanning the almost infinite chasm between Matter and 
