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contradictory to common sense, and to the very first intuitions of our 
nature — should have obtained the wide circulation which they have among a 
large circle, including many of the most powerful minds of our age. I have 
110 hesitation in saying that the subject handled in this paper is the very 
central one of the present system of practical atheism. The great and all- 
important controversy at the present day centres around the efforts which 
a number of powerful intellects are making to confound between the material 
and the moral ; and if it could possibly be established that this confusion 
does exist, and that the material dominates from one end of God’s 
universe to the other, then the paper abundantly shows that there is an 
end of all morality ; for unless the innermost intuitions of the mind are 
true when they tell us that if we are not free to do this or that, we can have 
no possible responsibility for the acts we do. (Hear.) It comes, therefore, 
to this, that the controversy lies verj^ much within the limits of common 
sense. To tell me that for the evil I do I am not responsible, is in reality 
asking me not to see that gaslight now before me, when I am seeing it as 
plainly as possible. What gives a degree of plausibility to these speculations 
is the frequent use of a great number of hard words : the tendency 
to do this runs throughout the works of the whole of this class of 
writers. The number of these hard words is so great that I find my own 
intellect somewhat confused when endeavouring to read them, and I think 
that if the authors I refer to would only write in plainer English, their 
systems would very soon be absolutely exploded. When we are asked to 
believe that our personality is nothing but a mere succession of feelings, 
what is it that we are asked to accept ? AVhj', something wdiich entirely 
contradicts the whole testimony of the human race from the moment man 
appeared as man to the present hour. Those who maintain this view cannot 
express themselves in language without distinctly denying the theories they 
expound. This show’s that there is something singularly absurd in the 
position they take. We have no certitude more certain than the perma- 
nency of the ego. To suppose that the whole experience of man from the 
commencement, both objectively and subjectively, is based on a simple 
delusion, would denote an amount of credulity exceeding anything that I can 
possibly conceive. But this is the result of the theories in question, not- 
withstanding the great names attached to them, that if they are accepted 
by the large body of mankind they will certainly end in subverting all sense 
of human responsibility. Evil then becomes merely a man’s misfortune, 
not his sin ; and crime, insanity ; and the result will be that the sane portion 
of mankind w’ill have to build a large number of asylums in which to place 
one-half of their fellows, so as to save themselves from possible dangers. 
There is only one other point upon which I would touch — I am bound to say 
that I cannot agree with the position which has been laid down to the effect 
that we can be philosophically free and at the same time theologically bound 
by necessity. I think that the position is hopelessly unmaintainable, that 
a thing can be theologically true, and philosophi callyfalse, or the converse. 
I do not care for any abstract theories. I say freedom is a fact— one of 
