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stronger powers, higher aspirations, that man is responsible for all he has 
so acquired. The doctrine of responsibility is grounded in our sense 
of retribution for all wrong that is done. I will grant very freely with all 
thankfulness to God, that in connexion with this doctrine of retribution, 
there is a sense that mediation between us and the judgment that is due to 
us is quite possible. A man does a wrong thing and fears the wrong he has 
done, but, at the same time, no man has put himself in this position without 
also having the feeling, that in some way or other some one will interfere. 
This interference we have, as Christians, in the mediation of Christ. How- 
ever, leaving this question of Calvinism and freedom of will and sense of 
retribution, and hope of mediation and intervention, I should like to go back 
for one moment to the beginning of the paper, and I promise that I will not 
detain you more than a minute or tw'o. It is a matter of common sense that 
the ego precedes every action of every kind performed by a human being. 
Action is not possible until there is an ego to act ; and here we see the very 
blunder which pervades IMr. Herbert Spencer^s philosophy. One is astounded 
to find that the same blunder has penetrated the whole of the materialistic 
mind of our age. They leave out the thought of this ego, wdiich w’e are very 
properly told by Mr. Spencer goes before the action. But he afterwards 
tells us this ego is the result, or is identical wdth the circumstances in 'which 
we find ourselves —the feelings which arise ■within us. He quite forgets that 
if there are feelings there must be an ego to feel. Whose feelings are they I 
They are the feelings of the ego — of the man. And this leads me to object 
ill the strongest way to the manner in which Mr. Herbert Spencer, and al- 
most all of us, are in the habit of usingjpopular abstract terms as though they 
were entities. Men say they are moved by motives. I may contemplate a 
certain thing and may consider it ; but the motive does not move me. It is 
I who move in the whole matter. Men speak of their having a memory. I 
have not one. I am thankful to say, I remember. (Hear, hear.) I have 
legs, but I should not say they consist of walking and running : the -walking 
and running are actions of the limbs set in motion by the ego. In every ■way 
we are injuring ourselves by abstract ideas. I do not deny that they are of 
great usefulness ; as Berkeley pointed out, as instruments of thought they are 
absolutely necessary. Some of them are but collective terms. When wc 
speak of a man, we use a word which is a general term, to describe what -wc 
mean, whether a white, a red, or a black man. It is a general term to 
describe the object we have in view. Every one knows what I mean in a 
general way, if I say, “ as I came to this room to-night I met a man.” You 
Avould not say I was speaking incorrectly if I did not describe how tall lie 
was, nor how he was dressed, nor what nation he was of, whether, for instance, 
he was a Frenchman or a Dutchman. These general abstract terms are both 
useful and necessary for the common purposes of the language. There is also 
a higher type of abstract words, and it is needless to pretend that these 
abstract ideas are entities existing apart from us, when they are the descrip- 
tions of those actions which we ourselves perform, and not our wills, our 
memories, or our reflections. I will ; I remember ; I reflect ; but do not tell 
