120 
and believe to be right and true. Men having full belief in the pains and 
rewards of eternity, have, nevertheless, gone in entire opposition to that belief, 
thereby proving that, universally, the will is absolutely free. (Hear.) Mr. 
Herbert Spencer is spoken of as a man of philosophic graep and of clear 
scientific conception. All I wicdi to say is this, that if I were to take Mr. 
Herbert Spencer’s assertions as entitled to my fullest credence, I could not 
believe in Christianity — in other words, I hold that it requires more faith to 
believe in Mr. Herbert Spencer, than to believe in Christianity. 
Mr. W. Griffith. — I think we are very much indebted to the author of 
the paper for having proved false or erroneous some of the arguments of iSlr. 
Herbert Spencer. W e need not refer to the Spencerian theory to understand the 
necessarian view. Whoever will look into the works of Hume and Priestley 
will fully understand that line of thought. They asserted that the con- 
nexion between motive and action is similar to that of cause and effect in 
physics ; that human actions are the result, not of choice, and that they are 
the sequences of physical causes, not the consequences of deliberate reason. 
Even those Avho in theory contend for the doctrine of necessity, in practice 
ignore it. Was Mr. Herbert Spencer a mere automaton when reading 
lirevious philosophical authors ? Did he exercise no deliberation when he 
composed his essays ? And when he had selected a publisher to print and 
circulate his opinions, were each and all of these processes the mere result of 
a fortuitous concurrence of material atoms ? 
If Ave rightly define the word law, Ave shall be able to understand all 
the fallacies which pervade the arguments of Mr. Spencer, and which 
have been refuted by the author of this paper. Then it Avill not be 
requisite to folloAV those arguments seriatim. How do Ave define Avhat 
Ave mean by the Avord “laAv”? Is it a mere sequence of effect? Is that 
a true proposition ? Surely not. There are laAvs physical and laws 
moral. The former must take eftect ; the latter ought to be obeyed. 
The latter, Avhen defined according to the nature of things, suppose dis- 
obedience possible, and postulate the freedom of the Avill. iSIost sound 
Avriters on morals and jurisprudence Avill tell you that hiAv is the expression 
of the AAull of the laAA^-giver enforced, by some sanction, upon the moral 
being. If you once admit this definition of law the Avhole scheme of 
Spencer falls to the ground, and needs no further exertion to destroy it. 
But destruction is not construction. It is easy to criticise and find fault with 
anything ; but we ought to consider Avhat we shall substitute in its place. 
We have to establish, as a matter of fact, tliat the AA'ill is free. 
The mere destruction of Mr. Spencer’s theory by Mr. Ground hardly 
establishes the positive side of the question. Dr. Irons appealed 
Avith great force to the feelings of the human mind, and, undoubtedly, 
there is a great deal in what he said. That is one argument in support 
of freedom of the will. But there are others. We may say, for instance, 
that every language proceeds on the supposition of the freedom of the will. 
How do you explain those words in the English language which are used to 
signify determination, choice, or judgment, Avithout supposing freedom 
