admitted. For instance, if a person, while defending his house against a 
robber, shoots his own servant when he intends to shoot the burglar, he 
is held not to be guilty of murder. He exercises his will in shooting, but 
there is no vice in what he does. In doing what he had a legal right to do 
he has unwittingly done what he did not mean to do. There is a defect in 
the use of the will. Then, if you take the case of an infant ; he may be 
put on his trial, but unless the understanding has been developed, ‘‘ he,” says 
the law, “ ought to be, as a matter of course, acquitted ; because he is not 
held to be responsible until he has reached years of discretion.” Again, take 
the case of a lunatic ; he is acquitted on its being shown that there is a 
defect of the understanding, and that he is not able rightly to exercise the 
will. It is there held that there is no moral, or at least no legal, vice in the will. 
All these instances go to prove that the administration of the law proceeds 
on the supposition that there is freedom of the will, and that the accused is 
punishable for its improper exercise. Again, we must recollect that this is 
not merely the state of the law in England. The French laws proceed on 
the same line ; so also do those of Germany and other European states. 
In fact, the testimony of the whole civilised world shows that the freedom 
of the will is looked upon as essential to guilt, and no one is punished unless 
that freedom exists. I will but mention the testimony of conscience, and 
the evidence derived from that. If we look to ourselves and remember what 
have been our own failings in the past experiences of our lives, we shall, as 
individuals, admit at once that we have had freedom to choose the right and 
avoid the wrong. Passing to the second part of the subject, I must say that 
to some extent I agree with Dr. Irons in his criticisms on the statements 
that have been made respecting the theological and moral view of freedom 
of will. I think it has been conclusively proved, not only that the 
theory of Mr. Herbert Spencer is unstable, but also, as a matter of 
fact, that freedom of will does exist, although it is true that great writers, 
such as Augustine, have taken up the theological question, and have 
somewhat obscured the doctrines of Christianity thereby. But Augustine 
was not consistent. I think Mr. Ground is correct in saying that Augustine 
tisked how can there be guilt if there is no freedom of the will ? But at 
another period of his life he wrote as if he looked on grace as irresistible, and 
held that freedom of the will did not exist. But the question is, 
What is Christianity ? and not. What were the views of St. Augustine ? 
We can recur to the original record, and we find St. Paul asserts 
not only the supremacy of Divine grace, but also the freedom of the 
•will. He tells us in the Epistle to the Philippians, ii. 12 and 13, that we 
are to “work out our own salvation,” and at the same time he says: — 
“ It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of His good 
pleasure.” This single text illustrates in a remarkable way the complex 
problem that may be raised as to the operations of the grace of God and the 
freedom of the will at the same time. (Applause.) 
Mr. J. Enmore Jones. — It seems to me that Mr. Herbert Spencer has in 
his mind only two facts — psychical and physical,— and that his argument is 
