grounded simply on these, which, in theological terms, we call the soul and 
the body. He seems to have lost sight of one other element. Most, if not 
all of us are often conscious of impulses and strength not our own, and we 
come as Christians to the contemplation of the three great powers we are told 
of by the Apostle — body, soul, and spirit, — it appears to me that this third 
power is a power which is not recognised by Mr. Herbert Spencer. I think 
that if this power were better defined, we should get rid of a great deal of 
the diflBculty .which has hitherto helped to obscure the matter. I have 
referred to this fact, so as to point out what I think has been very much 
overlooked, namely, that this power which we call spirit, has been especially 
created in us by the Deity and connected with the two other powers — the 
soul and body. The soul is, as Mr. Herbert Spencer says, attached to the 
body, and intermingles and works with it in a mysterious way ; but I say 
that these two are acted upon so as to produce visible effect, by the spirit, 
which Mr. Herbert Spencer has not alluded to. 
Kev. F. N. OxENHAM. — I suppose it will be admitted that in examining 
any philosophical problem, if we are in search of the truth, we ought not to 
allow any weight to supposed consequences. I mean that we should not 
permit ourselves to be at all influenced towards rejecting or towards accepting 
any theory, because it involves, or appears to involve, some consequence 
which we object to, or which we welcome. This, I suppose, we should all 
admit as a general rule. But, on the other hand, if a theory is put before 
us which obviously carries with it the negation of any well-known and 
indisputable truth, then we are justified in saying, “inasmuch as this theory 
necessarily involves the denial of what we know to be true, we do not care 
any further to inquire into it. It contradicts what is certainly true, and 
therefore it must be false.” Consequently, when we come across a theory 
which is admitted to be contradicted by the evidence, not of one language 
only, but of all languages, by the accordant evidence of all mankind in 
every country and of every age, by the establishment of every civilised 
government ever known (for all governments are constructed on the theory 
that man is a responsible being, and can do, or abstain from doing such 
things as are enjoined, or forbidden : the belief that this is so is evidenced 
by every law that was ever made), — when, I say, we come across a theory 
thus irreconcilably at variance with the universal testimony of mankind, 
we cannot justly be accused of prejudice if we put it aside, saying that 
we do not care to inquire into it. It is obviously false, being at variance 
with an undenied and undeniable truth. Now it seems to me that the 
tendency of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s argument is not to disprove the freedom 
of the will, but simply to ignore that there is such a thing as will at all. 
He is really arguing for the thesis, that our desires are not free ; and in 
showing this, he appears to think that he has shown that our ivill is not free. 
Our desires, he asserts, are the joint result of impulses over which we have 
little or no command. He brings much evidence to show the truth of 
this thesis, which we have no desire to question ; and then, having proved 
this, he imagines that he has disposed of what he calls “ the dogma of free- 
