124 
will.” “ The real 'proposition^^' he says, “ involved in the dogma of free- 
will is, that everij one is at liberty to desire or not to desire." This is 
a complete misconception. The question is not whether we are free to 
desire or not to desire, but whether we are free to follow our desires or not 
to follow them. Mr. Spencer’s assumption that will is nothing more than 
the result of those forces which produce natural desire, is an assumption not 
only without evidence to support it, but in the teeth of evidence which denies 
it. I cannot desire to be hanged, or shot, or sutfocated, or to undergo any 
great pain ; but I can ivill, I can choose to undergo any of these things. My 
desire to do a thing or not to do it, may be, I admit, simply an effort of 
nature beyond my control, the result of the joint action of various involuntary 
impulses, as Mr. Herbert Spencer has very clearly defined it. We do not 
quarrel with him for saying that our desires are the mere outcome of these 
natural impulses ; but we do quarrel with him for assuming that our ivill 
has the same origin and nothing more. And when he jumps to the conclu- 
sion that the will is not free because the natural desires are not free, we are 
compelled to pull him up, and to protest that such a conclusion is wholly 
unwarrantable. It is, in short, simply ignoring that there is any such thing » 
as will. I shall not, however, dwell fi\rther on this, ns Dr. Irons has already 
so clearly reminded us what is the true character of the will as one most im- 
portant element in the ego : but I wished to call attention to the fact that ]\Ir. 
Spencer is not really arguing against the freedom of the will ; he is arguing 
against the freedom of the desires, and then assuming that the freedom of tlie 
will is by the same arguments disproved. (Applause.) 
Eev. C. L. Engstrom. — Thirteen or fourteen years ago, when I was reading 
the Duke of Argyll’s book. The Reign of Law I saw what every one must 
see who gives the subject sufficient consideration, that the mind is subject 
to law as well as the body, and I think that unless we grasp this thought we 
cannot understand Mr. Herbert Spencer’s argument. Further, we are wrong, 
I think, if we regard the (free) Avill as a separate originating force ; the 
mistake seems to arise from the use of the word will in two entirely different 
senses. A strong will really indicates a strong mental nature, especially in 
regard to the desires, but free will is the ability to choose which of two or 
more existing forces shall come into operation. A strong will is a magnificent 
force directed by free will for good or for evil. The responsibility rests with 
the free will, though the strong will, which is merely an instrument in its 
hands, gets the blame when it is misdirected. But not to dwell overmuch 
on this magnificent, but subject force, we ought, as it seems to me, to hold 
that above the body and the mind, which consist, according to the best 
philosophers, of three departments — feelings, ideas, and desires— there reigns 
supreme a thing called the (free) will, and that that free wiU has the power in 
the case of every human being of directing actual forces, whether phj’^sical 
or psychical. It is a directing power and not a creative power — resembling 
the pointsman, who sees a railway engine hurrying along a line, and by the 
simple movement of a lever, gives it that direction which secures the safety 
of the train. And so all through the life of the human being this will of 
