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be understood that the world at large, scientific and unscientific, is accept- 
ing, as established, theories which are simply ingenious hypotheses. There 
is no doubt that at the present moment scientific men are apt to be very 
much like inventors. As soon as an inventor has a happy idea he rushes 
off to take out a patent for it. It is pretty much the same sort of thing 
with some of our scientific men. A scientific man has got hold of a good 
idea, which he thinks may turn out to be true some day, and he at once 
annoimces it as a positive fact, in order to be beforehand with it ; if it 
turns out to be all right, he is sure to be praised for his profound sagacity, 
and if it does not why, then, it will possibly last his time, and that is 
sufficient. (Laughter.) 
Professor Odell. — Professor Beale has shown us that materialism, with 
which he deals, is a cause of the decline of thought. I think, if we each asked 
ourselves the question, we should be unable to find a greater cause than that 
of materialism in producing this decline of thought. 
The Chairman. — Perhaps, before Professor Beale replies, I may be permitted 
to say a few words as to the question of dogmatism ; and on this point I think 
we must all feel indebted to one gentleman who has found a little hole in our 
armour. I am afraid that we of the Victoria Institute are rather apt to dogma- 
tise a little ourselves, and I think we should be careful, as far as possible, to 
avoid this fault. It is, doubtless, very pleasant to be able to say in a sweeping 
manner, “You are wrong but we must guard against doing so, especially as 
we are so ready to notice that our adversaries are very apt to do it. We ought to 
weigh ourselves in the same scales as those in which we weigh our opponents. 
Perhaps I may be permitted to call attention to the distinction between the 
words “dogmatic” and “dogmatism.” A dogmatic statement is a statement 
which is not hypothetical. When a truth is ascertained to be either de- 
monstrable, or so highly probable that it is morally certain, we assert it 
dogmatically and not hypothetically, and there is no harm in such an asser- 
tion being made dogmatically. Galileo, for instance, only asserted hypo- 
thetically that the earth moved round the sun ; but we, in the present state 
of astronomical science, are able to make the assertion dogmatically. It 
would have been wrong in Galileo to have asserted the fact dogmatically, and 
it would be wrong in us to assert it hypothetically. But dogmatism is a. 
different thing, and means the assertion dogmatically of what we ought to 
assert hypothetically. When a man arrives at a certain conclusion and 
thinks it is true, he foresees the induction or other logical process by which 
he will prove it ; and when, so thinking, he is able to prove it, he asserts it as 
proved, saying that others who differ from him are wrong ; that is dogmatism. 
It is this that we should be very careful to avoid. We should guard our- 
selves against asserting a thing as proved until it is proved, and should not 
consider that anything is disproved until it is really disproved. (Hear, hear.) 
Professor Lionel S. Beale. — I think the members of this Institute have 
been extremely merciful to me in the discussion of my paper, which I fancy 
contains some points that might have been criticised with much more severity 
